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Abstract 
The fragmentation and commodification of security governance that has taken place in 
the last half of the twentieth century has had far-reaching implications for social control.  
The Hobbesian idea of the sovereign state has been continuously challenged in this time 





 the state is now just one ‘node’ in a security network and has had to give up 
its role as primary governance auspice and accept the role of regulator; a hallmark of 
the post-modern era in which we live.  The ‘nodal governance’ framework forwarded by 
Burris et al.
3
 I find lacking in many respects; I therefore develop a hybrid model of 
governance based on the ‘nodal governance’ model, Baker’s
4
 ‘multi-choice policing’ 
model and Wood’s
5
 ‘local capacity governance’ which has specific significance for 
transitional states like South Africa.  I argue that the fragmentation and commodification 
of security governance has led to the erosion of social accountability and equity in South 
Africa due to three aspects of the ‘new’ policing;  first, the rise of private security 
governance in South Africa; second, the growth of illegitimate auspices of governance in 
South Africa; and third, the growth of community governance institutions in South Africa.  
With this in mind, I forward a normative framework by which security networks in South 
Africa can and should operate to ensure accountability and equity.  This framework is 
built on seven pillars; (1) the acceptance of the plural nature of policing; (2) the 
acceptance that the state is but one node in a network of security; (3) the pursuance of 
governance from below; (4) the acceptance of the public police’s role as regulators; (5) 
the need for incentives to achieve social responsibility; (6) the need for non-state 
regulatory bodies; and (7) the pursuance of a restorative justice ethos.         
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In 1651 Thomas Hobbes argued that human beings were self-interested individuals, 
involved ceaselessly in struggle with one another and in a constant state of insecurity.  
This he termed the ‘state of war’.  The only relief to this ‘state of war’, he postulated, lay 
in a ‘social contract’ to institute a civil society and give up individual freedom to become 
equal political subjects under one sovereign power.  On this sovereign power he wrote: 
  
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men (who naturally love Liberty, and 
Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in 
which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own 
preservation, and of a more contended life thereby; that is to say, of getting 
themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily 
consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no 
visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the 




Hobbes, it seems, would not be pleased with the contemporary state of sovereignty.    
 
* * * 
 
Security is an essential part of social life.  It helps in the creation of a peaceful society 
and helps dispel both rational and irrational fears and, in this way, helps keep society 
stable.  Its governance, therefore, should be held as being of the utmost importance.  
                                                 
6
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Until recently the governance of security had been, perhaps by default, jealously held in 
the hands of the sovereign state – a notion Hobbes would be extremely familiar with.  
Within the last half century, however, the governance of security has been displaced from 
its former home; the sovereign state has become less and less able to hold on to one of its 
main functions. This phenomenon has come to be identified by many names – 
fragmentation, pluralisation, dislocation, disintegration, decentralization, are among the 
most common.  Each of these identifying factors carries with it a new, and often unclear, 
explanation of what is taking place in the realm of policing and security governance.  
What is clear is that we are in the midst of a revolution as far as policing goes; a 
revolution which, if left unchecked, could leave us with a dilemma of global proportions.   
 
These phenomena of fragmentation, disintegration and decentralization; this “uneven 
patchwork of policing and security provision”
8
 has been slowly growing for the last thirty 
years and has, as a result, slowly been eating away at the sovereign state.   
 
In the past 30 years the state’s monopoly on policing has been broken by the 
creation of a host of private and community-based agencies that prevent crime, 




Recently, many authors have advocated a move away from the use of the term the police 
to the use of a more generic term; policing
10
, to describe without any doubt those 
activities undertaken by groups or individuals to ensure their own, or others’, security.  
This shift is essentially the embodiment of the fragmentation of security governance.  In 
the first instance, the police have been wholly symbolic of the state since antiquity and 
hold a special place in the hearts and minds of many state citizens.  Loader makes this 
point clear when he points out that 
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…the public police continue to be identified within prevailing English mentalities 
and sensibilities as the principal source of security and protection, and that despite 
attempts to ‘demystify’ them, the police retain among large swathes of the (law-




The police represent the sovereign state to a great degree; their meticulously presented 
uniforms indicative of a stable political unit.  Secondly, instituting a generic term such as 
policing and putting it in place of the police effectively separates the policing function 
from the state; sending the clear message that it is acceptable to not look to the state for 
the provision of security governance in your business or residential neighbourhood.  The 
sovereignty of the nation state, then, is effectively being eroded; its final foothold – the 
monopoly over the legitimate use of physical coercion
12
 – is now being relinquished to a 
myriad of governance actors (even though it still remains the final regulator of these 
actors).  Loader and Walker bring this issue to the fore when they note that 
“[i]ncreasingly, the state is becoming the final source and regulator of legitimate coercion 
administered by others.”
13
   
 
This is a characteristic of the ‘regulatory state’ – a state as the regulator of a variety of 
services as opposed to the provider of these services.  The governance practices of the 
regulatory state can be contrasted with those of its predecessor, the welfare state which 





…the regulatory state governance form involves a complex set of changes in 
public management involving the separation of operational from regulatory 
activities in some policy areas (sometimes linked to privatization), a trend towards 
separating purchasers and providers of public services (through policies of 
contracting out and market testing) and towards separation of operational from 
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policy tasks within government departments and the creation of executive 
agencies. Each of these policies shifts the emphasis of control, to a greater or 
lesser degree, from traditional bureaucratic mechanisms towards instruments of 
regulation. Government departments (or nominated agencies or self-regulatory 
bodies) now regulate the provision of services (setting down standards, 
monitoring for compliance and enforcing) through the instruments of statutory 




   
This is a world inhabited by a variety of actors and organizations performing various 
services, policing and governance functions which were historically the responsibility of 
government.  This has meant that the lines originally drawn between state, market and 
civil society have begun to blur.  All these phenomena are part and parcel of the specific 
age in which we live – postmodernism – and the specific sensibility to which we 
subscribe – neo-liberalism.  The postmodern world is one characterized by both 
globalizing and localizing trends which have effectively left the nation-state wanting in 
terms of being the key political unit of governance.
16
  It is also a world in which, of the 
three spheres of life mentioned above, the market dominates; “increasing amounts of 
social, cultural and political life have become commodified.”
17
   
 
O’Malley and Palmer point to three key developments in the move to neo-liberalism. The 
first has to do with a focus on the commercial enterprise model by most institutions, state 
and non-state.
18
  This development has seen the privatization of previously state-owned 
institutions and the remodeling of remaining state-owned institutions.
19
  Second, as 
Russell Keat
20
 notes, a move away from terms like ‘client’ patient’ and ‘student’ to those 
of ‘consumer’ and ‘customer.  Third,  




 Newburn T ‘The Commodification of Policing: Security Networks in the Late Modern City’ (2001) 38(5-








 Keat R ‘Introduction: Starship Britain of Universal Enteprise?’ in Keat, R & Abercrombie, N (eds) 
Enterprise Culture (London: Routlegde, 1991) at 3. 
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…a vision of enterprising and responsible individuals and private organizations is 
developed and inculcated.  This involves ‘ rather loosely related set of 
characteristics such as initiative, energy, independence, boldness, self-reliance, a 





The commodified nature of postmodern life has meant, perhaps obviously, that the 
relative positions of the wealthy and the impoverished have come more to the fore in 
terms of who has the means to purchase the services on offer.
22
  This has especially 
become problematic with the emergence of new security markets throughout the world, 
and the situation is exacerbated when these security markets begin to infiltrate weak, 
failing and transitional states.  We live in a risk society; a society in which crime is 
generally accepted as a normal social fact
23
 and the fear of crime guides how people view 
both the public police and those operating within a given security market.  Some look to 
the former for protection, while others look to the latter.  It is a contemporary truism that 
those who opt out (either by choice or not) of service provision by auspices of the 
security market are often left wanting in terms of protection and security as they have to 
rely solely on a frequently under-resourced public police force.  The consequences of this 
tend to be ever more apparent and in need of attention in transitional states, such as South 
Africa.   
 
In this paper I am primarily concerned with the consequences of pluralized security 
governance for South Africa, a relatively young democracy with a violent past.  I deal 
with the political and economic dimensions of plural policing in this transitional state and 
how these relate to accountability, which ultimately affects and is intertwined with 
equity, democracy and human rights.
24
  In particular, I am concerned with the 
                                                 
21
 O’Malley & Palmer (note 18) at 142. 
22
 See, for a discussion on governance deficits, Shearing & Wood (2003b). 
23
 Newburn (note 16) at 835. 
24
 It is important to note that, while the main focus of this paper is accountability, equity, human rights, 
democracy and accountability are necessarily connected and cannot easily be disconnected and dealt with 
in isolation – this would be a pointless endeavor in my view.     
 9 
commodification of security in South Africa and how this phenomenon has exacerbated 
the wealth disparity in the country.  I also deal in no small measure with the related issues 
of private, common and public goods, as well as public or social versus contractual or 
financial accountability.  My secondary concern stems from the following quotation;  
“…if diverse policing networks are to avoid ‘compounding’ extant inequalities, then 
institutional means have to be found of connecting such networks to the ‘public’ or 
‘common’ good.”
25
  I forward a normative framework as to how security networks can 
and should function in South Africa.  In order to do this, I first develop a hybrid 
framework based largely on the nodal governance model forwarded by Burris, Drahos 
and Shearing and based on Baker’s multi-choice policing model as well as Wood’s local 
capacity governance model.  This hybrid framework, I believe, is more suited to the 
African context as it takes into account both the historical and (perhaps less important) 
the cultural factors which have shaped states on the continent.  
 
This paper is written in four parts.  In chapter two, Aspects of the ‘New’ Policing, I 
discuss issues related to the new shape of policing and security governance that has 
currently emerged.  In particular I detail the outcome-generating system, the network 
society and nodal governance, offering a short critique of each.  I argue that these three 
concepts are useful but that their usefulness is limited by their neglect of historical and 
cultural factors in society and governance.  As a result of this, I conclude that these two 
concepts have little relevance to the African context and, following this, I forward a 
hybrid model of security governance based largely on Castells’s network society and 
Burris, Drahos and Shearing’s nodal governance model, but also based on Baker’s multi-
choice policing model and Wood’s local capacity governance model.  In chapter 3, 
Aspects of Transitional States, I outline briefly the key points on transitional states and 
give a brief overview of the South African situation, beginning with the rise and reign of 
apartheid and ending with post-apartheid South Africa.   
 
Chapter 4, Commodification, Fragmentation and Accountability, is the main chapter in 
this paper.  I pose a specific set of questions related to the pluralisation of policing in 
                                                 
25
 Loader I ‘Plural Policing and Democratic Governance’ (2000) 9(3) Social & Legal Studies 323 at 335. 
 10 
South Africa and discuss how the fragmentation and commodification of security 
governance has affected social accountability and how this accountability is achieved.  In 
the main I argue that, due to the rise of contractual accountability and its higher 
contemporary priority, the commodification and fragmentation of policing acts to 
exacerbate existing inequalities, specifically in transitional settings where the public 
police system is, at best, weak.  I also argue that conceptions of the ‘public good’ are 
fundamentally altered due to the fragmentation and commodification of security 
provision and that this is eroding our society further.  In chapter 5, the concluding chapter 
of this paper, I forward a new normative framework by which security networks in South 
Africa (and, indeed, other transitional states) can and should function; a framework by 
which social accountability of non-state auspices of governance is possible.  I also briefly 
discuss what opinions I have come to with respect to the commodification and 
fragmentation of policing in South Africa. 
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Chapter II 
Aspects of the ‘New’ Policing 
 
“…government is no longer a unified set of state 
instrumentalities.  The sovereign is not dead, but is just one 
source of power” (Braithwaite, 2000: 90). 
 
The emergence of new forms of governance in the last thirty years has led to the rise of 
an oligopoly
26
 of governance actors who act above, through, beyond and below the 
state.
27
  Private police corporations, community governance actors and ‘responsiblized’
28
 
citizens are both the products of and factors contributing to the postmodern age in which 
we live. 
 
[A]s we approach the century’s end, the provision of policing and security is in 
Britain and other late-modern societies becoming ever more fragmented and 
commodified…The protection of person and property is now less and less the 
exclusive province of the public police, and is increasingly being delivered by a 




There is a growing body of literature which has attempted to understand these 
developments in security governance.  Within this social scientific body of literature the 
fragmentation and commodification of policing has been understood in terms of the 
spread of ‘mass private property’ and changes in property law in the United States and 
other countries
30
, the ‘fiscal crisis of the state’
31
, “the unmet – and seemingly insatiable – 
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demands of anxious citizens for police protection”
32
 and much wider changes in 




These and several other concepts are of the utmost importance to us in outlining the new 
shape of policing in this section and in developing a hybrid model of security 
governance.  Particularly useful for our purposes is the idea that society should be 
conceived of as an outcome generating system
34
 – a collectivity of people who perform 
actions which create either good or problematic outcomes.  To make sense of the 
pluralisation of governance the concepts of nodal governance, rule at a distance and 
governance deficits are also useful.  Bruce Baker’s multi-choice policing model and 
Jennifer Wood’s local capacity governance model are useful for conceptualizing 
governance at a transitional level.  It is particularly important to recognize the 
commodified nature of contemporary security governance as well as the rise of an 
exclusive society in which economic, political and particularly social exclusion are not 
only viewed as normal but as fixes to crime problems which have their roots embedded in 
issues at a much deeper level.  In the section that follows I propose a hybrid model of 
contemporary security governance based largely on Castells’ conceptions of the network 
society and the nodal governance approach forwarded by Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 
although my ideas will not be based solely on these models.  My conception, I hope, will 
more adequately apply to the governance of security in South Africa and other 
transitional states.     
 
Outcome Generating Systems, Networks and Nodal 
Conceptions of Governance: towards a hybrid model of 
contemporary security governance 
 
Postmodernism has brought with it new forms of governance coupled with new 
conceptions of how governance is administered.  Many academics, social scientists and 
                                                 
32




 Burris et al. (note 1). 
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legal scholars have begun to provide explanations for these new developments in 
policing.  Probably the most prominent (and the most useful for my purposes) is the 
nodal governance thesis forwarded by Clifford Shearing and his associates.  In a thought-
provoking paper, Nodal Governance Burris, Drahos and Shearing develop the model of 
the same name.  Central to their thesis is Hayek’s general reader The Constitution of 
Liberty in which he argues, in epistemological fashion, that human planning and 
organization has limits and that the markets cannot be forgotten as a means for bringing 
order to complex systems, among other things.
35
  Hayek restates the importance of the 
ideals of individual liberty for the growth of Western civilization.
36
  He is concerned, 
most importantly for us, with the nature of social order and how it relates to liberty.   
  
We are concerned in this book with that condition of men in which coercion of 
some by others is reduced as much as possible in society.  This state we shall 




Burris, Drahos and Shearing argue that governance is typically and inherently a complex 
issue and that governance in interaction is of even greater complexity.
38
 Viewing 
governance as simply existing within the realm of the state is insufficient in terms of its 
contemporary pluralized nature.
39
  Using Hayek’s notions, the authors develop their 
argument that any collectivity (society at large, criminal gangs, voluntary organizations et 
cetera) can be conceived of as an ‘outcome-generating system’ (‘OGS’).
40
   
  
Take any group of people living in the same place or on some other basis 
identifying themselves as a group for at least some important purposes.  We will 
refer to this as a ‘collectivity’.  The things these people do create outcomes over 
space and time.  These outcomes are not necessarily the result of their intentional 
activities or of their activities alone.  Outcomes are produced by the complex 
                                                 
35




 Ibid at 11. 
38




 Ibid at 33. 
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interaction of what people do, how they relate to one another, the institutions, 
technologies and mentalities they deploy, their biological equipment and 





The outcomes created by these systems can take the form of ‘goods’ (such as peace, 
happiness and economic efficiency) or ‘problems’ (such as famine, violence and 
depression).  The identification of outcomes can be seen as objective but people often 
differ as to what should be considered as a ‘good’ or a ‘problem’.  As such, the 
identification of outcomes is more usefully seen as a subjective process because it 
depends upon “our making causal connections between some subset or conceptualization 
of elements of an OGS and some set of outcomes”.
42
  Our subjective view of the products 
an OGS produces lend to biases in this respect.  It is important to note that every single 
state of affairs in the world produces an innumerable range of effects.  We, as human 
beings, consider only a limited number of these effects with the view to understanding 
that state of affairs.  These biases not only lend to us attributing cause mistakenly, but 
also lend to us not recognizing important outcomes.
43
   
 
What is important are individuals’ abilities to understand the rules of cause and effect; to 
understand that every outcome is a product of what has come before and is a contributing 
factor to what must come in the future.  This is a valuable adaptation which can be tacit 
or embedded in a collectivity’s way of being.  However, because every outcome is a 
product of what has come before, processes continue over time instead of being static and 
our attempts to break apart causal chains are invariably biased, we will get it wrong.  One 
of the things that determines the ratio of ‘goods’ to ‘problems’ is the ability of a 
collectivity to learn the workings of the OGS and how to manage them – to ‘get it 
right’.
44
  Collectivities generally differ in their capacities and abilities to ‘get it right’; to 
manage the OGS and the outcomes it produces and every collectivity has to adapt to both 
                                                 
41
 Ibid at 34. 
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a physical environment and a social environment, often overlapping with other 
collectivities and OGSs and often being subjected to a range of different influences.  This 
leads to every collectivity facing tasks of regulation – producing more goods than 




Hayek argues that the success of a collectivity depends largely on the extent to which 
people within the collectivity make adaptations as individuals and how these people 
collectively manage the OGS so as to maximize knowledges and capacities held 
throughout the collectivity.
46
  Above all, these adaptations (which can take the form of 
rules, institutions, principles, habits et cetera), can be viewed as forms of regulation. 
 
Some of these adaptations are created with the intention of governing while others 
evolve less conspicuously and may not be thought of as regulation but as tenets of 
religion or mere facts of life.
47
   
 
From the assumption that all collectivities can be seen as outcome-generating systems, 
the authors develop a model of nodal governance also based loosely on the work of 
Manuel Castells.  Castells postulates that the age in which we are currently living, the 
Information Age, gives rise to a network society; “[t]he network society is the social 
structure characteristic of the Information age”.
48
  He notes, in Marxist fashion, that 
human societies (social structures) are made from conflictive interactions between 
humans.  Interactions based on relationships of production and consumption, 
relationships of power and relationships of experience.  For Castells meaning is produced 
and constantly reproduced between the symbolic interaction of actors within a given 
social structure.  In one way, his analysis of human societies lends itself to the 
assumption mentioned above – that collectivities can be viewed as outcome-generating 
systems – meanings (as with outcomes) are produced (or identified) subjectively by an 
                                                 
45
 Ibid at 36. 
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 Hayek F A Law, Legislation and Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973). 
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 Burris et al. (note 1) at 36. 
48
 Castells M ‘Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society’ (2000) 51(1) British Journal of 
Sociology 5 at 5. 
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individual or actor in the way that he or she understands the purpose of the action that 
created the meaning in the first instance.   
 
Also, in a similar stance to Hayek, Castells stresses the importance of production and the 
market in human societies.  The three bases of relationships in a social structure – 
production/consumption, experience and power - he describes as such: 
 
Production is the action of humankind on matter (nature), to appropriate it and 
transform it for its benefit by obtaining a product, consuming (unevenly) part of 
it, and accumulating the surplus for investment, according to socially decided 
goals.  Consumption is the appropriation of the product by humans for their 
individual benefit…Experience is the action of humans on themselves, 
determined by the interplay between their biological and cultural identities, and in 
relationship to their social and natural environment.  It is constructed around the 
endless search for the fulfillment of human needs and desires...Power is the action 
of humans on other humans to impose their will on others, by the use, potential or 
actual, of symbolic or physical violence.  Institutions of society are built to 
enforce power relationships existing in each historical period, including the 




There is, however, a fourth layer embedded in Castells’ explanation of social structures.  
A layer that interacts with and influences production and consumption, experience and 
power (as well as culture) – technology; taken by Castells to mean “the use of scientific 
knowledge to specify ways of doing things in a reproducible manner.”
50
  Technology can 
fit in with every other layer of a social structure mentioned above; it is used as knowledge 
to obtain a given product (production/consumption), it is also decisive in the realm of 
power (for example, with respect to military technology) and in the sphere of human 
experience (for example, reproductive technology as a means for framing family 
relationships and, for instance, we are now seeing the rise of security technology which 
                                                 
49
 Ibid at 7. 
50
 Ibid at 8. 
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would effectively frame relationships between society proper and the criminal Other).
51
  
Technology and meaning, for Castells, are “fundamental ingredients of human action – 
an action that ultimately produces and modifies social structure.”
52
   
 
Castells proposes that we have entered a new technological paradigm, one in which 
micro-electronics-based information/communication technologies and genetic 
engineering technologies are fundamental characteristics.  This paradigm, he argues, has 
given rise to the network society; a society in which knowledge and information are not 
particularly central in their role (because these two things were already central in all 
societies).
53
  Instead, a new set of information technologies is held paramount.   
 
I contend that they [the new information technologies] represent a greater change 
in the history of technology than the technologies associated with the Industrial 
Revolution, or with the previous Information Revolution (printing).  Furthermore, 
we are only at the beginning of this technological revolution, as the Internet 
becomes a universal tool of interactive communication, as we shift from 
computer-centered technologies to networked-diffused technologies, as we make 
progress in nanotechnology (and thus in the diffusion capacity of information 
devices), and, even more importantly, as we unleash the biology revolution, 





Castells asserts that the rise of the network society transforms all spheres of life.  
Economically, we are seeing a new order; an economy which has become informational 
(the capacity to generate knowledge and process or manage information determines the 
productivity and competitiveness of all economic units), global (with the rise of new 
communications technologies, economic units can now compete on a global scale) and 
networked (economic units are becoming ‘internally de-centralized’ and externally 
                                                 
51
 Ibid at 8-9. 
52
 Ibid at 9. 
53
 Ibid at 9. 
54
 Ibid at 10. 
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networked with other economic units).
55
  In keeping with the new economic order, 
Castells argues that work and employment are “substantially transformed”; with more 
cognizance being given to flexible work (part-time and contractual employment, informal 
or semi-formal work agreements et cetera) and the ‘feminization’ of labor (which leads to 
the ‘flexible woman’s’ gradual replacement of the ‘organization man’).
56
   
 
Culturally, too, there are changes.  We see culture being more and more organized around 
electronic media (such as the internet and cellular telephones).  People are networked 
culturally in a way like never before; the mass media (television, satellite television, 
radio) can reach out to everyone or only a targeted few.  In a way Castells is arguing that 
people are becoming more and more detached from one another, but at the same time 
becoming closer to one another.   
 
Our symbolic environment is, by and large, structured by this flexible, inclusive 
hypertext, in which many people surf each day.  The virtuality of this text is in 
fact a fundamental dimension of reality, providing the symbols and icons from 




Politically, the world is being influenced by culture (and, specifically, the new networked 
culture).   
 
In almost all countries, media have become the space of politics.  To an 
overwhelming extent people receive their information, on the basis of which they 




Overall, it is safe to assume that the new network society outlined by Castells is 
transforming the way we interact, the meanings we create and our relationships with 
others.   
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More importantly for our needs here is the model of nodal governance forwarded by 
Burris, Drahos and Shearing which is based to some extent on the model of the network 
society discussed above.  Networks are important in their analysis, most especially in the 
information age because “technology…has allowed networks to retain their adaptability 
and at the same time achieve superior levels of coordination and management of 
complexity”.
59
  The authors introduce us to the idea that any site of governance can be 
thought of as a node of governance.  Nodes, however, can only be conceived of with the 
disregard of a state-centered view of governance.  It is clear that we have moved away 
from this view, as Shearing and Wood note, “[p]olicing has become increasingly an 




Nodes, Burris, Drahos and Shearing argue, are sites where the lines of a particular 
network intersect and are sites within an OGS where governance takes place.
61
  For the 
authors, nodes within an OGS are sites where knowledge, capacity and resources are 
mobilized to manage a particular course of events or a particular outcome.    The authors 
assert that a node exhibits four particular characteristics: 
 
• A way of thinking (mentalities) about the matters that the node has 
emerged to govern; 
• A set of methods (technologies) for exerting influence over the course of 
events at issue; 
• Resources to support the operation of the node and the exertion of 
influence; and 
• A structure that enables the directed mobilization of resources, mentalities 
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Nodes can take a variety of forms; from legislatures to community governance 
associations, from government institutions to non-governmental organizations et cetera.  
What the authors do stress is the fact that nodes are not virtual points where the lines of a 
network intersect; they are real even though they do not have a particular structure nor 
are they necessarily formed intentionally to manage an outcome.  Nor are nodes 
necessarily legitimate in their functioning (that is, they do not necessarily function within 
the bounds of the law) (see Burris, quoted below).  What is interesting is that a node can 
exist both within space and time and within either exclusively, even though it is not a 
virtual entity.  Nodes can exist alone, or they can make up part of a larger assemblage of 
nodes.  Even though it is noted in the literature that the nodes do not need to have a 
particular structure, some sort of structure is still required for a node to be useful.  This 
point Burris makes vivid: 
 
[A] node must have some institutional form. It need not be a formally constituted 
or legally recognized entity, but it must have sufficient stability and structure to 
enable the mobilization of resources, mentalities and technologies over time. A 
street gang can be a node, as can a police station or even a particular shift at a 
firehouse. A node like this may be primarily part of an integrated network, like a 
department in a firm; it may be linked to other nodes in multiple networks without 
having a primary network affiliation, like a small lobbying firm; or it may be what 
we call a ‘superstructural node,’ which brings together representatives of different 
nodal organizations … to concentrate the members’ resources and technologies 




   
 
Nodal governance fits quite neatly into our network society.  One cannot forget, however, 
that even though the rise of the network society has fundamentally changed power 
relations, power is still essential to our social life and the governance of our social life.  
As such, nodes must inevitably be sites of power.  Peter Drahos makes this point clearly: 
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Nodal governance is a theory that focuses on the role of nodes in governance and 
especially in the way networks can be linked to create concentrations of power for 
the purposes of exercising governance.  Nodes are either actors within a network 





When nodes are the organizational product of two or more networks, they are referred to 
as super-structural nodes.  These nodes, according to the literature, do not integrate 
networks like their counterparts.
65
  Instead, the super-structural node brings together 
actors from different networks and nodal assemblages in order to concentrate resources 
towards the achievement of a common goal.
66
  Examples of super-structural nodes would 
include, but not be limited to, South Africa’s Business Against Crime (BAC) 
organization or, on a more global level, the International Police Force (Interpol).  Super-
structural nodes are viewed as the command centers of networked governance and they 
are important in society because 
 
[t]ying together networks is one very important way in which nodes gain the 
capacity to govern a course of events.  This tying together creates a node with 
increased resources at the same time as it creates a structure that enables the 
mobilization of those resources to produce action by other nodes in the network.
67
   
 
What is important to note at this point is the fact that all nodes are not created equal, they 
vary (sometimes greatly) in their accessibility, their efficiency, the other nodes they can 
influence and how that influence is exerted.
68
  This is because technologies, mentalities 
and access to resources will differ across space and time and these differences will have a 
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great impact on how particular nodes are constituted and managed.
69
  Perhaps not 
unrelated to this is the assertion that nodes always relate to each other and exert their 
power over one another with the view to furthering their own interest.
70
  Nodes can act in 
cooperation with one another (such as in the case of contractual agreements or 
sponsorship) but can also act in “benign neglect” of one another or in outright conflict 
with one another (such as in the case of state police organizations and criminal gangs.
71
  
Whatever the case, it is important to note that nodal governance is useful for 
conceptualizing and understanding the new forms of governance which now abound 
around us.  As Burris notes: 
 
[Nodal governance is] intended to enrich network theory by focusing attention on 
and bringing more clarity to the internal characteristics of nodes and thus to the 
analysis of how power is actually created and exercised within a social system. 
While power is transmitted across networks, the actual points where knowledge 




It is also important to note that nodal governance is lacking in certain respects.  This is 
possibly due to one of two (perhaps not unrelated) reasons.  The first has to do with the 
particular model of society on which it is based, while the second has to do with the level 
of analysis on which it engages relevant issues.  The biggest shortfall of the nodal 
governance approach when it comes to applying it to transitional states such as South 
Africa is, in my opinion, its general disregard for the historical and cultural factors on 
which a particular state or society is based.  This is problematic for many nations in 
Africa generally (and South Africa specifically because of its undemocratic past under 
apartheid).  The atrocities committed under apartheid and their impact on the post-
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apartheid state is evidenced in the work of many authors
73
 but this will be dealt with in 
more detail below.   
 
The shortfall in terms of nodal governance’s neglect of historical and cultural aspects 
most likely has to do with the model of society on which nodal governance is based – 
Castells’ theory of the network society.  While Castells recognizes the ideals of 
production/consumption, experience (or knowledge), power and (not to any great extent) 
culture, he fails to recognize the histories of societies and how these histories set them 
apart from one another and, related to this, he fails to give any real weight to the cultural 
aspects of societies, mentioning them only in passing (in fact, culture is afforded little 
attention within many contemporary security governance frameworks
74
).  The vagueness 
of the nodal governance framework with regards specific historical and cultural factors 
influencing nodes and the intricate differences between (public and private) node is 
encapsulated in the following quote: 
  
In a nodally governed world, states may have unique characteristics, but they 
occupy no special analytic space: they govern and are governed like other nodes.  
It follows, however, that non-government nodes do not occupy a space that is 
defined as different in relation to government.  The public-private distinction is 




The private-public distinction is also an important one when dealing with transitional 
states for the primary reason that public security governance agencies (such as the police) 
are often drastically under-resourced and consequently less able to deal with crime than 
private governance entities.  In other words, private entities of governance often operate 
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at a higher capacity than public auspices of governance so the private-public distinction is 
useful to recognize even at purely a conceptual level.  Bruce Baker
76
 more adequately 
deals with the private-public divide (although, he too finds it not conceptually useful 
when concerned with Africa) and, more importantly the historical aspects of African 
societies in his two articles Living with Non-State Policing in South Africa and Multi-
choice Policing in Africa.  It is in the latter article that he forwards the multi-choice 
model of security governance.  While the nodal governance model and the multi-choice 
models are not mutually exclusive, they both contribute greatly towards a hybridized 
model of security governance.   
 
In Africa, the issues of pluralisation, fragmentation and commodification of policing 
become even more pertinent and in need of attention; the turbulent histories suffered by 
many African states (such as South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia) means that 
the state of democracy on the continent is already relatively unstable.
77
  Also, many states 
in Africa have had their fair share of non-state governance systems (whether authorized 
by law or not), which means that the ‘new’ policing further complicates matters.  
Commentaries on the effects of fragmented policing are in abundant supply; Baker
78
 has 
been particularly instrumental in this respect.  In his article on multi-choice policing 
Baker gives a basic overview of non-state policing on the continent.
79
  He makes mention 
of the fact that traditional justice systems have been in place for a long time due to the 
relative incapacity of the public police to provide acceptable levels of security – “public 
policing in Africa not only fails to serve all equally…but neither is it free”.
80
  The 
fragmented nature of policing in Africa is made vividly clear by Baker in his book Taking 
the Law into Their Own Hands.  He distinguishes between policing as an activity rather 
than being confined to a police organization and makes it clear that policing in Africa is a 
complex and multi-faceted issue.
81
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Baker’s multi-choice model of security governance addresses the fact that the African 
citizen is often overwhelmed by a barrage of security providers, some of which are 
public, but most of which are private.  It is from this group of providers that the African 
citizen must choose.  This has been referred to as ‘institutional shopping’ by others.
82
  
Baker describes the multi-choice model as such: 
 
As people in Africa move about their daily business, so they move from the 
sphere of one security agency to which they would naturally look for protection to 
another or are faced at times with a choice of agency, to be made in terms of 





Even though Baker notes that the public/private divide is not useful in terms of plural 
policing in Africa,
84
 he at least recognizes it as being problematic for the multi-choice 
policing model.  His main selling point, however, has to do with the fact that Baker 
recognizes that African states possess their own (possibly violent) histories and that these 
histories could have changed the course of their development in terms of governance.
85
   
 
Africa outside of South Africa is still largely uncharted.  Is it like South Africa, 
but 20 or more years behind because of its economic development; or is it 




While Baker’s work is useful, a third player in the security governance field needs to be 
considered.  Jennifer Wood, in her paper entitled Cultural Change in the Governance of 
Security, builds on the nodal governance model by arguing that not only do different 
governing nodes possess different capacities (ways of acting), knowledges (ways of 
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thinking) and resources, they often take on the sensibilities of other nodes in order to 
further their progress in the security field.
87
  In this way, she further acknowledges the 
plural nature of governance and develops a model of local governance “aimed at 
fostering a new culture of security promotion along with the institutional arrangements 
and processes required to support this culture.”
88
  While largely focused on the public 
police and their resistance to changes in the security field due to their engrained culture, 
Wood’s work is an important contribution to this paper because it addresses the cultural 
sphere of security governance; a sphere not often addressed.  
 
A hybrid of these three models would be ideal for states on the African continent.  
Because of their, often violent, histories and their rich cultural diversity (for example, 
South Africa has eleven official languages) African states sport a unique form of 
democratic governance; one that is possibly hybridized in itself.  Built on the nodal 
governance framework, I would like to propose, as Burris, Drahos and Shearing do, that 
we see nodes in a governance network not as isolated entities, but as interactive and 
dynamic.  But also to go further than this, I propose that we see nodes as assimilating one 
another’s qualities in order to govern more effectively.  Also, nodes should be seen as the 
products of history and culture as well as the products of the outcomes they arose to 
govern.  Outcome-generating systems should not be seen as basic and fundamental in 
their functioning, they should be recognized as human societies, innately complex with 
no predictable outcomes.   In the same light, the network society should be seen not as 
flat and two-dimensional, but as three-dimensional, having links going both upwards and 
downwards to signify those actors (or nodes) governing outcomes below and above 
government as well as alongside and through government,
89
 as well as to signify the 
complex and often incoherent state of African governance systems.
90
  This hybrid model 
is more readily acceptable to me in terms of its holistic nature and its relevance to states 
in Africa and other transitional states in the world.        
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Indirect Rule, Commodification and Governance Deficits 
 
Two important concepts have now come to the fore with the changes in security 
governance over the last thirty years; the first can be seen as a colonial throw-back in 
terms of managing and governing a particular society, while the second has to do with the 
negative outcomes of the new forms of governance taking place globally.  I will deal with 
each in turn below.   
 
Postmodern governance has become detached from the state.  The modern state has 
adapted and learnt to selectively decentralize; that is, decentralize its peripheral functions 
while still retaining control of its core functions.  We have seen this taking place not only 
in the realm of security governance but also in other spheres of government (for example, 
the privatization of previously government-owned services such as transport networks 
and medical services).  Here we could use Osborne and Gaebler’s nautical analogy of the 
state performing the steering functions of governance while leaving others to perform its 
rowing functions.
91
  Shearing and Wood put it this way: 
 
Central to neo-liberal sensibilities has been the argument that the ‘rowing’ of 
governance is more effective and efficient if it takes place locally and if 
governmental services are provided through markets and market-like 
mechanisms.  The reinvention of governance that has taken place under the 
guidance of this sensibility has promoted arrangements that enable the ‘steering’ 





The decoupling of state’s rowing and steering functions has lead to the development of a 
security market which has commodified security to a great degree over recent decades.  
This commodification exercise has lead to a number of problems for less well-off, less 
well-represented individuals and communities around the world; to borrow Castells’ term 
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– a ‘fourth world’,
93
 forgotten by the rest of the world and left without safety and 
security. Shearing and Wood’s paper Governing Security for Common Goods is useful in 
understanding these problems.  They outline several key concepts which are of great 
value to this project.  In their paper, they pose the following question: “…how do we 
govern security in ways that promote objectives and concerns of ‘communities’?”
94
  And 
related to this: 
 
…what kinds of nodes and nodal arrangements are required to promote and 





The authors place the “public” and the “private” on two ends of a continuum (with public 
interests and private interests on their respective sides).  Common interests, they argue, 
fall on neither side of this continuum, but somewhere in-between; “we are concerned 
with the question of how to enhance common interests that are neither purely “public nor 
purely “private”, but somewhere in the middle of a continuum”.
96
  The middle of this 
continuum, according to the authors, is made up a variety of collectives that share 
common objectives and concerns;
97
 community or common institutions of governance 
operating by means of community contracts within and across communal spaces.
98
  
Examples of contemporary community institutions would include Business Improvement 
Associations (Districts)
99
 and gated communities
100
.   
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Community governance institutions (such as corporate bodies, discussed below) have 
common interests which may or may not overlap with public interests and, in some cases, 
“community auspices of government might pursue objectives that are unambiguously in 
conflict with the pursuit of public goods”.
101
  A common feature of community 
governance (in the form of gated communities, university campuses and Business 
Improvement Associations) is the regulation of individuals through community contracts 
which might include requiring residents (temporary or permanent) to comply with set 
norms “that far exceed those established by the state”.
102
  By complying with these 
norms, individuals or residents receive common goods such as security provision.  It is 
important to note that through the payment of fees and levies (which act as private taxes), 
residents living in these secluded, exclusive societies
103
 buy or opt in to a market for 
common goods;
104
 a market to which access is rested on a persons’ buying power rather 
than one’s social citizenship.
105
  It is here that Jock Young’s words ring true: 
 
The transition from modernity to late modernity can be seen as a movement from 
an inclusive to an exclusive society.  That is from a society whose accent was on 




Academics have introduced a new notion to emphasize the exclusionary capacity of 
community governance which they have termed “club goods.”
107
  A “club good” can be 
distinguished from a public good by its excludability; “if a shared good can be rendered 
de facto or de jure excludable it may be better described as a ‘club good’.”
108
  The ‘need’ 
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for this excludability is brought about by the rising fear of crime
109
 and (perhaps as a 
result) the rise in awareness of the criminal ‘Other’.
110
  From a normative point of view, 
the rise of community governments has led to the exacerbation of governance deficits 
which can be categorized into  
 
[(a)] deficits of self-direction (inequalities in the determination of, and access, to 
common goods), [(b)] deficits of community capital (inequitable access to 
economic, social and other forms of capital to support community governance), 





Individuals who enter into community contracts, we shall use the term “denizens”
112
 to 
describe them because it is an all-encompassing term,
113
 have access to decision-making 
processes which have a direct bearing on common goods as well as the common goods 
themselves, access to economic, social and other forms of capital and access to the capital 
to support community governance.  Governance deficits come about when certain 
auspices or actors play a more direct role in governance or have greater access to 
decision-making processes than others.  It has been noted that access to these processes 
(or the common goods that arise from them) is not guaranteed by social citizenship but 
rather by one’s denizenship, a status which is ultimately the product of one’s buying 
power.
114
  Many authors have noted
115
 that only some actors and communities have the 
(financial) resources to participate in the markets for goods.  These concepts can be 
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applied to the existence (or lack) of institutional arrangements for mobilizing local 
capacities and resources (deficits of self-direction), exclusions from common goods and 
common spaces (deficits of community capital) and contractual accountability (deficits of 
regulation).  This leaves us with a dilemma; one that has to do with the commodification 
of security.   
 
…as individuals are thrown back upon their own resources, the commodification 
of security effects a relocation of policing services in favour of the (already) 
advantaged at the expense of the disadvantaged…It serves, in particular, to harden 
divisions between those consumers who are well placed to become active risk 
managers and those (generally more ‘at risk’ groups) whose demands for safety 
the security market expresses relatively little interest in satisfying. 
It is these widening cleavages in the distribution of policing benefits and burdens, 




It is safe to assume that the pluralisation of governance is not always democratic in nature 
because the ‘local rowing, state steering’ arrangement promoted by neo-liberal 
sensibilities has not quite worked according to plan.  In fact, many authors have 
commented on the fact that the fragmentation of governance provision has compounded 
inequalities. 
 
The pluralisation of policing promises to increase safety and has already done so 
in some places.  The problem is that pluralizing under market auspices at present 
does not improve security equally across society.  It favors institutions and 




What is more is that the evidence suggests that the growing wealth disparity between rich 
and poor is associated with a growing governance disparity.
118
  One of the main driving 
forces behind the fragmentation of policing has been the growth of the corporate 
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 corporations have become “strong actors”;
120
 “powerful auspices of security 
governance”,
121
 involved in both the rowing and the steering of governance and, as a 
result, have become what Macaulay has termed ‘private governments’.
122
  In this view 
corporations, economically (privately) motivated, can enforce governance in accordance 




Shearing and Wood put the rise of corporations as auspices of governance down to the 
shift in property relations around the world.
124
  “New” spaces, or privately owned 
communal spaces (such as leisure centres, shopping malls and Business Improvement 
Districts); ‘mass private property’
125
 are becoming a common feature under the “new 
regulatory state”.
126
  The emergence of corporations as auspices of governance is also 
made possible by a shift in property relations in North America and other parts of the 
world, which has meant that the “re-feudalization” of security governance is located 
within state law; particularly property and contract law.
127
     
 
Corporate entities possess the resources required to directly govern and to mobilize the 
resources necessary to implement these directions.  Such resources include, but are not 
limited to the use of private security entities such as those hired by Business 
Improvement Associations
128
 or residential communities.
129
  In such cases these agents 
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do not operate as state agents with a rule-at-a-distance framework but rather work for 
non-state governing auspices to promote, in some cases, narrow private interests but more 
often common interests (such as the interests of a business community).  Sometimes these 
common interests overlap with public interests.  At other times, however, certain 
common interests (such as those of business) may not be compatible with other common 
interests (for example, those of the homeless), which could raise complex public interest 




All of these issues present a particular set of problems for transitional states particularly, 
especially with respect to accountability.  As Burris, Drahos and Shearing note, “nodal 
governance permits the concentration of unaccountable power, concentrations that can 
act through networks to globalize inequalities”.
131
  Moreover, the pluralisation of policing 
makes accountability (and therefore democracy, equity and a sound human rights base) 
difficult to achieve in some respects.  Bayley & Shearing make this point clear when they 
note that democratic principles require that police (and policing in general) be 
accountable to the public so that they serve the interests of the public.
132
  However, “[t]he 
problem with this view is that the accountability provided by markets accrues to buyers 




The commodification of security has also allowed preference to be given to financial or 
contractual accountability
134
 over social or public accountability.  This is not merely 
happening at the non-state level either; the public police in a number of states 
(transitional states included) have begun to adopt a more managerial approach to policing 
making them more financially accountable.
135
  Many authors have spoken about the 
effects of pluralisation on accountability.  Braithwaite puts it this way: 
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The realities of the new regulatory state pose severe accountability problems.  The 
power of the state police might be constrained by legal rights.  In the world of the 
new regulatory state, when it wants to abuse these rights it might contract the 
work out to a private policing organization that is not subject to them, or suggest 




This issue, however, will be dealt with in much greater detail in the chapters to follow.  
The fact of the matter is that the fragmentation of policing has made the public police 
more aware of their position; leading them to greater levels of ‘managerialism’, 
‘consumerism’ and ‘promotionalsim’.
137
  The rise of consumerism in late-modernity has 
been the main driving force behind the commodification of security and the 
commodification of the public police.  Mike Brogden uses the example of South Asia and 
puts it like this: 
 
Citizens were to become consumers, with telephone numbers of officials to be 
contacted in case of complaints against the police displayed prominently at police 
stations.  Visitors to the Police Commissioner’s Office were to be received by 
reception officials.  Grievances would be addressed speedily.  Station house 
officers had been directed to interact with the office-bearers of residents’ 
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Chapter III 
Aspects of Transitional States 
 
“Due consideration should be given to transitional 
processes and hopefully it has now become clear for us all 
that the international community cannot afford – be it 
morally or financially – to allow countries to relapse into 
conflict. That is why post-conflict peacebuilding is so 





Contemporary interest in peace-building, peacekeeping, the maintenance of democracy 
and the governance of security in transitional states has been rife since the third wave of 
democracy.
140
  Previously war-torn states like Northern Ireland and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and states recovering from violent and oppressive pasts like South 
Africa have all come into the limelight of late.  A country in transition has been described 
as a society that shows substantial evidence of the modification of some or other 
distinguishable feature by which it had previously been identified.
141
  It has also been 
noted that a transitional state is one which has recently moved from an authoritarian form 
of governance to a democratic form of governance.
142
  Both of these definitions are 
suitable for our purposes here.  It is important to recognize the distinction between 
transitional and collapsed or failed states as the two are often confused as being one and 
the same.  Robin Luckham speaks about collapsed states as follows: 
 
The terms ‘state failure’ and ‘state collapse’ are often used to characterise the 
state’s loss of its monopoly of public power and public coercion during conflicts.  
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Both have to be used with a certain amount of care, since the problem is not 
always so much the state’s loss of its coercive powers, as its abuse of them.  ‘State 
failure’ is the more usual situation, and implies a normative conception of the 
states failure to meet its responsibilities towards its citizens.
143
   
 
Issues of security governance become even more pertinent and problematic when dealing 
with states in transition.  In the first instance, it has been noted that crime levels tend to 
be higher in transitional settings for reasons I will not go into here (for example, 
Durkheim’s anomie theory suggests that rapid social change has criminogenic effects).
144
   
  
It has often been said that crime in South Africa is related to the transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy. Similar patterns appear to apply in other 
transitional societies such as those which have moved from military to civilian 
rule in Latin America, the former communist regimes of Eastern and Central 
Europe; as well as states in Africa, most clearly illustrated by Nigeria and 





Secondly, the criminal justice machinery by which the authoritarian state used to function 
before its democratization is usually warped and obscure because of its use in the support 
of an oppressive government.  This is usually, if not always, the criminal justice system 
that states in transition to democracy have to work with.  To take Alvin Boskoff’s classic 
view, “[transitional society]…is marked by a series of structural and psychological 
tensions which are products of an imperfectly revised social structure.”
146
  This problem 
faces all transitional states.  The lack of democratic structures of governance and, related 
to this, the lack of social accountability makes states in transition unique.  In a conference 
paper on the governance of security, David Jemibewon noted the following about the 
Nigerian transition: 
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Virtually every institution had to undergo a learning process, having been 
militarized previously and having no standard to fall back on due to the absence 





Third, and perhaps not unrelated, because of the (usually) violent and oppressive nature 
of past experiences, citizens of transitional states tend to harbor feelings of distrust and 
disdain for the institutions which govern them which makes it difficult for these 
institutions (especially the state’s police force) to establish any kind of legitimacy within 
the state.  Moreover, in situations where governance institutions are (or were) not viewed 
as legitimate by the citizens they govern, it becomes difficult for these institutions to 
enforce the rule of law without resorting to physical coercion.
148
  It is also the case that 
this resort to physical violence further reinforces that institution’s lack of legitimacy, 
making the situation a self-fulfilling prophecy.
149
  It is a truism that weak states often 
cause global problems because of their inability to relate properly to the international 
system of governance.   
 
In the modern world, the state – at least in theory – has to fulfil a dual function 
with regard to political order: first, the state shall organise and guarantee public 
order domestically within a defined territory; second, all states together constitute 
the international system and, thereby, the global order. Ineffective, weak, failing 
or failed states – which can be subsumed under the rubric of fragile statehood – 
tend to undermine both functions and cause problems at the national, regional and 
global level. In particular, for experts on development issues, it is common 
knowledge that many post-colonial (or post-Soviet) states are unable to provide 
basic public functions and services vis-à-vis their citizens and are incapable of 
                                                 
147
 Jemibewon D ‘The Nigerian Experience’ Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies.  Conference 
Paper (Johannesburg, 30 August – 1 September 2000) at 29. 
148
 Guelke A ‘Crime, Justice and the Legacy of the Past’ Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies.  
Conference Paper (Johannesburg, 30 August – 1 September 2000) at 61. 
149
 Ibid at 61. 
 38 
performing their duties and responsibilities as members of the international 
community.
150
   
  
Luckham notes two narratives of security governance in transitional states which may be 
useful for our purposes.
151
  The first is optimistic; it has to do with the advance of 
Western liberal democracy which started in South America and parts of Asia before the 
end of the Cold War and continued in the 1990s with the dissemination of state socialism 
in the USSR and Eastern Europe and the “wholesale dismantling of ‘developmental 
dictatorships’ or bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes’ in the South.”
152
  The narrative goes 
on to suggest that by the late 1980s free market economics was firmly in place as the 
developmental norm for international financial institutions (IFIs) and donor 
organizations.  Political pluralism and good governance practices followed closely which 
cleared the path for market-orientated economic reforms in weak or failing states.
153
  In 





The second narrative is substantially less optimistic.  It questions whether the dismantling 
of authoritarian regimes in the South and communist rule has brought about genuine 
democratic transitions or new forms of domination by the elite. 
 
Rather than enjoying healthy political pluralism, many new democracies have 
been torn apart by ever more violent ‘new’ conflicts, often on the basis of ethnic 
or religious identities. 
These political crises are partly attributed to the contradictions of the new 
orthodoxies of democracy and the market, and their failure to address 
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international inequalities and rising world-wide poverty, arguably aggravated by 




These new conflicts, Luckham argues, give rise to new insecurities in transitional 
nations.
156
  Many transitional democracies go through rigorous transformations to stem 
the tide of new conflicts arising and to curb one or more of the three problems mentioned 
above (those of rising crime levels, outdated institutional machinery and public 
skepticism).  These transformations, which may or may not be effective, wholly affect the 
capacity of state institutions of governance to deal with and effectively neutralise 
problems (such as high crime rates and prison over-crowding).  I would like to borrow a 
useful term from Boskoff, if I may, to describe this capacity as the ability to make social 
decisions.
157
  Boskoff describes social decision as the organized response of a social 
system to deal with social and material innovations (problems) and notes that social 
decision may take one of two forms: 
 
(1) [T]he problem-solving variety, which involves a relatively conscious attempt 
to meet crises squarely and with minimum strain on the future operation of the 
social system; and (2) the postponement of social decision, or an inadequate 




The latter form of these can be described as social indecision, which is rife in the 
transitional state because of its lack of institutional mechanisms to deal with problems 
promptly and effectively.  In this way, social indecision can be seen as both the resultant 
of and contributing factor to the transitional situation facing a particular state.  As a result 
social indecision acts as a vicious cycle being created by the transitional situation and 
acting to block effective institutional developments.  Transitional or fragile states are in a 
truly unique position in that, to go back to my previous point of citizen skepticism of 
security mechanisms, the actors providing security are often the main source of injustice 
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  McLean and Scheye make this point clear – “Healthcare or education 
provider may not always offer a good service, but they rarely do direct harm. However, 
the means by which justice and security are delivered or withheld by providers is often a 




What is interesting to note is that recent research suggests that 80-90% of the population 
in fragile states look to non-state actors for security provision.
161
  One needs to look no 
further than Baker
162
 for evidence of this.  It is a truism that non-state policing networks 
are embedded in the histories and cultures of many fragile states (specifically in Africa).  
This legacy dates back to colonial times when ‘rule at a distance’ strategies were 
commonplace.  
 
This phenomenon presents transitional states with both a unique set of problems and a 
unique set of opportunities.  For one thing, the state would find it extremely difficult to 
establish its legitimacy and convince its citizens to leave what they have known for years 
and subscribe to state institutions of governance.  Secondly, the preexistence of non-state 
governance actors means that accountability for what is done in the name of justice and 
security is either non-existent or very weakly enforced.  It is here that the distinction 
between contractual or financial accountability and public or social accountability
163
 
becomes important.  Third, and perhaps related to the previous point, is the issue of the 
“public good” (spoken about above) which may be jeopardized in favour of a more 
lucrative common or private good, or even a ‘club good.’
164
  These points detail some of 
the problems related to the preexistence of non-state governance actors in transitional 
states.  However, if these states found a way to enhance the capacity of these non-state 
entities, this may be highly useful in the fight against crime and other social problems.  
Julie Berg discusses these types of partnerships in South Africa and gives an example of 
this: 
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It seems to be the case that the private security companies submit to police 
authority and there seems to be an understanding that the SAPS ‘runs the show’.  
One security industry representative described the relationship with the SAPS 




The New South Africa: its violent and oppressive past and 
post-‘war’ transition to democracy 
 
Before 1994, the nationalist driven National Party (NP) had held the reigns to South 
Africa for more than half a century. Needless to say policing the state prior to 1994 was a 
very different, and often violent, story.  South Africa was a police state and the then 
South African Police (SAP) force were the most loyal agents of the oppressive 
government. The SAP “was a deeply racist organization that was at the forefront of 
enforcing apartheid’s immoral and discriminatory laws.”
166
 The force under apartheid 
was characterized by an ideology of white male supremacy over their black 
counterparts.
167
 The concept of apartheid was inextricably linked to the ability of the 
government to contain, oppress and separate black people from the rest of the minority 
white population.
168
  It was the job of the SAP to maintain the apartness and the hate 
syndrome on which apartheid had thrived. Between the years of 1948 and 1994, a number 
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Apartheid suggests, therefore, an alternative to integration, a segregated country in which each 
racial group will enjoy full rights in its own area. 
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of uprisings were quashed violently by the police force and, due to the absence of a Bill 
of Rights, gross incivilities were allowed and, indeed, accepted as normal. The SAP force 
was determined by the ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism which saw its heyday in the 
thirties and forties.  
 
By the late-1980s, however, the apartheid war machine had been relatively dismantled.  
The un-banning of opposition political parties and the release of Nelson Mandela had 
effectively marked the end of oppressive governance in South Africa.  However, the 
legacy of apartheid was still fresh in the minds of South Africans when the 
democratically elected government took over in 1994. The scars left by the oppressive 
regime still showed, and the ANC was cautious in the way it proceeded. A Bill of Rights 
which protected the most human basic rights was drawn up soon after democratization 
and the interim constitution of 1993 was finalized in 1996.  Gareth Newham notes that: 
 
With the abuses of apartheid era policing still fresh in the minds of many citizens, 
the architects of South Africa’s new constitution were careful to ensure that the 





The hard-edged policing strategies that reigned under apartheid were placed aside and in 
1996 the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) was formulated. Its focus was 
proactive crime prevention rather than reactive crime control. The NCPS prioritized 
community involvement in crime prevention initiatives and promised to re-engineer the 
criminal justice system, making it more efficient. These sentiments were short-lived. In 
2000, the NCPS was superseded by the National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) 
which focused, as the name suggests, on reactive crime combating. Later, the government 
would start a campaign entitled zero-tolerance against crime and which brought hard-
edged policing practices back from the dead. The notion of zero-tolerance was not just a 
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nice sounding notion, it was a political ideology, and it cast South Africa into a neo-
apartheid – a segregation of alleged criminals from the general population. 
 
The zero-tolerance approach to policing (or ZTP) is testament to the fact that the South 
African government, even after democratization, remained very politically and 
economically focused in their fight against crime.
170
  This could be attributed to a number 
of reasons which are beyond the scope of this project.  Suffice to say that the all-out war-
on-crime ideology was fueled by the rise of the fear of crime, the growth in feelings of 
insecurity countrywide and the inability (or perceived inability) of the newly named 
South African Police Service (SAPS) to eradicate crime and offer security after 1994.  In 
present times South Africa is much the same; the SAPS are wholly understaffed and 
under-trained, making them unable to deal with the rising crime rates.
171
  The public 
police are going through the same changes that police around the world are going through 
– the search for a new role in the world of fragmented governance.
172
  What they have 
settled on can only be described as a consumer-orientated role; where managerial 
practices are paramount and citizens become consumers of security.
173
  They have 
become just one node in security provision, albeit the dominant one. 
 
In sum, I have outlined above what I think are the key aspects of the governance of 
security in transitional or weak states.  I noted that it was important to recognize the 
distinction between transitional states and failed or collapsed states, with the former 
being those states in the transition between autocratic or oppressive rule and democratic 
rule and the latter being those states which have lost their monopoly over public power 
and public coercion.  The governance of security, I have argued, becomes more 
problematic and pertinent in the case of transitional states because of three main things.  
First, crime levels tend to rise in transition due to the rapid social change taking place.
174
 
Second, there is a lack of legitimate institutions of governance – governance institutions 
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are usually handed down from oppressive regimes and are unable to deal with new 
democratic demands.  Third, public skepticism of these institutions tends to be high due 
to their past abuses under autocratic or oppressive regimes.   
 
I have discussed two possible narratives of security governance forwarded by Luckham 
which I found to be particularly useful.  The first has to do with the proliferation of 
Western liberal democracy after the Cold War and the dismantling of dictatorships and 
authoritarian regimes while the second narrative questions whether the dismantling of 
these dictatorships and regimes actually achieves real democracy and does not just 
plunge these nations into new conflicts.  I have also discussed the work of Alvin Boskoff 
who introduced the useful concept of social indecision in transitional societies which can 
be seen as both a result of and a contributing factor to transition.  I have noted that most 
citizens of transitional societies rely heavily on non-state actors of security provision 
which may have detrimental effects on state legitimacy, accountability and the 
achievement of the ‘public good’ but may also be useful in terms of policing partnerships 
and shared resources.  In concluding this section, I have very briefly discussed the past 
and current state of the South African criminal justice system and the South African 




Fragmentation, Commodification and Transitional Dynamics: 
The South African Case 
 
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, 
and mind; as that though there bee found one man 
sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind 
then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the 
difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, 
as that one man can therepon claim to himselfe any benefit, 
to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to 
the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to 
kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by 
confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with 




We begin this chapter, then, with the common belief that all are created equal and that 
this is something that should be guaranteed to everyone.  New ways of governing security 
are, however, degrading this guarantee.  In this section I am concerned with 
fragmentation and commodification of security governance in South Africa, a transitional 
state still recovering from an oppressive regime and a violent past.  I am particularly 
concerned with the way in which the commodification and fragmentation of policing has 
eroded social accountability in South Africa and how this relates to issues of equity and 
democracy for all.   
 
I start this section with a discussion of the current trends in the pluralisation of policing in 
South Africa and compare these to trends taking place abroad.  I believe that this 
comparative perspective would be a useful tool in exploring how commodification and 
fragmentation affects accountability in South Africa.  I then discuss how the pluralisation 
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of policing affects South African society arguing that it is often detrimental to 
accountability and, therefore, detrimental to equity and democracy.  The purpose of this 
section, then, is two-fold – (1) to offer a comparative perspective of current trends in the 
pluralisation of policing in South Africa and abroad, and (2) to forward an argument that 
the commodification and fragmentation of policing is detrimental to social accountability 
(in view of contractual or fiscal accountability) and, therefore, detrimental to equity and 
democratic values.  
 
 
Current Trends in Commodification and Fragmentation: 
South Africa, Africa, Europe and the United States in 
Comparative Perspective 
 
In his paper, Commentary: Community Policing: A Panacea from the West, Mike 
Brogden argues that policing strategies are being exported from the West and implanted 
into Africa without due regard to the local capacities, cultures and knowledge already in 
place.
176
  South Africa is well accustomed to this kind of ‘policy transfer’.
177
  Elrena van 
Der Spuy notes that  
 
…there is no single composite framework in terms of which South African 
policies regarding crime have been constructed over the past eight years.  Crime 
control debates and practices draw freely from different sets of principles and a 
large pool of competing ideas.  For example, in the case of young offenders we 
are implored to find ways of making peace between victims and offenders within 
the paradigm of restorative justice. In the case of sex offenders, however, many 
argue in favour of a much more punitive and segregative approach to “justice” for 
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those who prey off the flesh of women. In other quarters too we speak with forked 
tongues: calls for zero-tolerance and state-driven saturation policing coexist with 
calls for greater tolerance to others and selfhelp policing. We remain divided if 
not confused on matters such as the proper role of the state vis-à-vis the central 
business of crime control. We profess the necessity and desirability of 





This means that South Africa is literally a melting pot of differing (some compatible, 
others competing) crime control strategies and policies informed, probably in large part, 
by ideas from the West and the North and in constant interplay with the new trends 
towards the fragmentation and commodification of security governance.  South Africa’s 
past means that a unique ‘patchwork’ of policing and security provision (not unlike 
Europe;
179
) has emerged with governance actors operating on both sides of the law 
(business corporations, volunteer groups, criminal gangs and vigilante groups
180
 and 
community institutions).  Below I will very briefly discuss three areas of security 
governance which I believe are central to the commodification and fragmentation drive – 
(1) changes in public police focus and culture, (2) the pervasion of private security and 




Currently, there is a big drive in South Africa and in other parts of the world towards 
what I will call good community-police relations.  This means that the public police, both 
in South Africa and elsewhere, are not so much a tough-on-crime force (one with the 
monopoly of legitimate physical coercion) as it is a consumer-orientated machine focused 
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largely on service delivery to the citizen (who has become the consumer
181
).  This ethos 
of managerialism has been spurred, in my view, in large part by the proliferation of 
private auspices of security provision and a belief in the need to compete with these 
auspices.  The Hobbesian view of the nation-state has long been replaced and if this 
nation-state is to hope for any kind of legitimacy it needs to deliver better, and cheaper, 
services than the corporate entities which have replaced it.  
 
Generally, Africa is following international patterns of fragmentation and 
commodification.  First, the public police’s introduction of managerialism, consumerism 
and promotionalism has been the hallmark of (post)modern policing in the Britain and the 
United States.  Loader has, logically, put this down to the pervasion of consumer culture 
in recent times: 
 
We inhabit a consumer culture. While disputes abound as to how best to explain 
and periodise it…few sociological commentators doubt that the practices, beliefs, 
values and passions associated with consumption lay a major role in structuring 
contemporary economic, social and cultural life…The recent fate of the English 





Other authors, too, have been alerted to these developments in public police culture in 
Britain.  Newburn  puts this down to two things; first the Metropolitan Police’s ‘Plus 
Programme’ which aimed to re-present the police force as a service and second, the 
Conservative Government’s Financial Management Initiative which took place in the 
early 1980s.
183
  In South Africa the move to rename the South African Police (force) to 
the South African Police Service (SAPS)
184
 was perhaps a double-edged sword meant 
both for renewed public trust in the police and meant as a drive towards managerialism.  
There was a big move by South African policy-makers to follow Britain in terms of 
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implementing local financial management of the police force in order to improve its cost 




In South Africa, there was a deliberate attempt to replicate the English experience 
of implementing LFM. The English police force described by Collier (2001) was 
asked by the Department for International Development (DfID) to assist the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) in their implementation of LFM, working with the 




In fact, the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1996 (even though defunct 
now) was very much focused on service delivery and the public’s perceptions of crime 
and the criminal justice system.  Community policing initiatives have also been pervasive 
in Africa and overseas.  In the United States community policing forwards concepts like 
problem-solving and partnerships between the police and the communities which they 
serve
187
 and is seen as an effective tool for crime prevention.   
 
In Africa these community developments have been tainted by difficulties in 
implementation and maintenance.  Ruteere and Pommerolle note that community 
policing in Kenya may operate to reinforce undemocratic principles and oppressive 
structures in that society
188
 and Brogden argues that community policing is a Western 
solution to local African problems, making it ill-attuned to deal with the unique crime 
risks presented in Africa.
189
  In South Africa, one of the visions of the public police was 
to foster relationships between themselves and the community
190
 and community policing 
as a model was built into the Interim constitution of 1993
191
, however, the initiative is 
impractical for South African purposes.  One of the reasons for this is the fact that 
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Most communities do not have the institutional (organisational) capacity to 
effectively support community outreach projects. These communities have poorly 
developed infrastructural capacities, scarce resources and skills, inadequate 




This has meant that, in contrast to Britain and the United states, the communities most in 




The role of private policing auspices has become wholly pertinent to any debate about the 
commodification and fragmentation of policing.  In Britain and the United States, the 
number of corporate auspices that provide security has been steadily growing; in 1994/95 
there were a total of 8259 security provision businesses in Britain.
193
  Also the 
introduction of new security technologies globally has meant that new niches for security 
provision have begun to spring up.  These include new technologies like Closed Circuit 
Television (CCTV) which is big business in Britain and in South Africa.  
 
The private security industry in South Africa is by and large equally booming.  While the 
figures have fluctuated over the years, in 2005 there were over 4500 security provision 
businesses registered with the Security Industry Regulatory Authority (SIRA).
194
  The big 
difference between South Africa and Europe and America in terms of private security is 
the relative lawlessness of some security actors.   
 
The [private security] industry has been plagued with dubious practices, 
particularly by some of the small, sometimes unregistered, operators.  These have 
tried to establish themselves by cutting costs through paying wages below the 
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national minimum and skimping on firearms training.  Stories of illegal activities 




I have no doubt that activities like these take place around the world but they seem 
altogether more pronounced in the African context.  Perhaps this is because of the 
political instability of much of the African continent.  In Africa more generally, the 
private security industry is similar in genealogy and growth (with a few exceptions).  In 
Kenya, for example, the rise of private security firms began in the 1960s and exploded in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  It is estimated that there were as many as 2000 private security 
firms operating in Kenya in 2005 and this number has continued to rise.
196
  Further north, 
however, the growth of the private security has not been as consistent or as high; in 
Nigeria there were only an estimated 1500 private security firms in 2005, most of which 
were relatively small businesses, and in Sierra Leone there were only between 20 and 30 
companies operating in the same year.
197
  Perhaps these discrepancies are due to the fact 
that many security ‘companies’ operating in these areas are informally run, for example 




Other Non-State Governance Actors 
 
Non-state governance actors in Africa take a variety of forms.  From ethnic/clan militias, 
religious police in Kenya
199
 to volatile vigilante groups and criminal gangs in Cape 
Town
200
  to community governance institutions in Zambia, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa.
201
  One can see big differences between South Africa and Western nations as far 
as these groups are concerned.  For one thing some of the groups who operate on the 
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other side of the law (such as criminal gangs and some vigilante groups) actually provide 
security services to those in their communities, albeit for private gain.  What is more is 
that, in many South African communities, people actually trust these groups more than 
they trust the public police.  Ian Loader would call this type of governance governance 
from below;
202
 but it is a type of governance influenced largely by oppressive histories.  
Andre Standing gives an example of this: 
 
The second social dimension to the Cape’s criminal elite is related to their role in 
regulating aspects of community life. In this respect they bear resemblance to the 
classic Sicilian Mafioso, who functioned as a form of criminal governance in a 
region where the state was weak and ineffective. 
 
In parts of the Cape Flats the prominence of non-state governance can be traced to 
the apartheid era. During this regime the government became preoccupied with 
issues of security threats and political rebellion while grossly underfunding ‘non-
white’ areas. An irretrievable situation was created in which many areas became 
‘ungovernable’, characterised by poverty and a deep-rooted animosity towards 
state institutions and representatives. As a reaction to this breach between state 
and certain communities, informal groups such as people’s courts and street 
committees were established to sort out disputes and deal with crime. 
 





There are many similarities in the nature of commodification and fragmentation of 
security governance between South Africa (and Africa in general) and Britain and the 
United States.  There are, however, many differences due in largely to the oppressive 
history South Africa was subjected to before 1994.   
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Fragmentation, Commodification and Accountability: A 
Practical Look at how the ‘New’ Policing is Eroding Social 
Accountability and Equity in South African Society 
 
Philip Stenning, in a paper entitled Powers and Accountability of Private Police, argued 
that those who reach the conclusion that the public police are highly accountable while 
the private police are hardly accountable are wrong because they place too much faith in 
the effectiveness of public police accountability mechanisms and are not practical enough 
in their explorations of these mechanisms, and they understate the mechanisms available 
for the achievement of accountability of the private police.
204
  He forwards the following 
definition and explanation of accountability: 
 
When we think of the accountability of the public police, as with other 
governmental agencies, we think of four broad modes of accountability – 
accountability through the political process (‘political accountability’), 
accountability through the judicial system (‘legal or judicial accountability’), 
accountability within the  administrative systems of the state (‘administrative 
accountability’, which may be internal, within the organization itself, or external, 
through the wider administrative apparatus of the state), and some mechanisms 
through which the police are directly accountable to citizens, by-passing the 
political, legal and administrative institutions of the state (‘direct public 
accountability’).  Collectively, these various modes of accountability account for 




While Stenning’s definition of accountability is useful and provides a good basis for a 
definition of accountability, it is not sufficient for my purposes in this paper.  I am 
concerned here with social accountability; that is, accountability of governance structures 
to society at large, and seeing as this paper is written to address a specific kind of 
accountability issue, namely, social accountability of non-state governance actors, I will 
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take as my starting point, in forming an operational definition of accountability, Jones’ 
conference paper on accountability in the age of plural governance.
206
  Jones argues that, 
as far as public policing is concerned, four audiences of accountability can be identified; 
government, local communities, individual citizens and purchasers of policing (although, 
this last one, strictly, should not be considered in the South African context; see 
below).
207
  Following this, four types of accountability are identified; legal (rules and 
legal procedures), political (representative bodies), managerial (auditing bodies) and 
administrative (complaint systems).
208
  Two other types of accountability can be added to 
this set; accountability through the media and civil society
209





I would like to propose that, in developing an operational definition of social 
accountability, we take only a select few of these elements into consideration, in 
conjunction to Stenning’s definition.  In the first instance, the ‘purchasers of policing’ 
cannot be seen as an audience of accountability in South Africa because, as far as my 
knowledge extends, the South African Police Service does not sell its services and we 
already know that non-state auspices of government (such as private security firms) are 
accountable to their customers.  Second, self-regulated accountability cannot be included 
in this definition because, again, this is a business-orientated type of accountability, with 
the fear of losing business driving non-state auspices to perform professionally towards 
those who opt into the security market and not necessarily to those who are 
disadvantaged (although this could be the case in some instances); this type of 
accountability does not necessarily guarantee social accountability and equity.   If we do 
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this, we get a definition of social accountability that points towards the following 
audiences:   
 
• Government (local and national); 
• Non-state accountability auspices211 
• Local communities and; 
• Individual citizens; 
 
Social accountability would also be made up of five (amended) types of accountability 
under this new definition: 
 
• Legal and judicial; 
• Political; 
• Managerial;212 
• Administrative and;  
• Civil. 
 
However, the most central element of social accountability in this paper is civil 
accountability; that is, accountability through civil society at large (civilian oversight et 
cetera) because society at large is perhaps most affected by the activities of governance 
institutions.  This definition of accountability is most applicable to a pluralised view of 
governance because it recognises that the state is but one player in a particular security 
network.  This is evidenced by the fact that the state is an audience of governance (to 
which non-state actors can be accountable).   
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The complexities of the new regulatory state
213
 pose a serious set of problems for social 
accountability and equity in a pluralised, democratic society.  A number of questions are 
raised when one considers the proliferation of security markets and the diverse set of 
security providers to choose from.  How are market auspices of security provision held 
socially accountable?  What oversight mechanisms are in place to this regard?  With such 
a diverse range of security providers, how do we regulate security markets?  How do we 
ensure that everyone is getting their ‘fair share’ of security?  How do we ensure that 
democratic rights and liberties are not being violated in the interests of a private version 
of security?  How does the ‘exclusiveness’ of today’s society relate to equity, and is there 
such a thing as equity in this case?  Many of these questions have gone unanswered, and 
will remain so.   
 
My purpose here is to argue that the commodification and fragmentation of security 
provision has eroded social accountability and, as a result, equity in South African 
society.  Perhaps, when all is said and done, these questions will answer themselves.  
Below I argue that three aspects of fragmentation and commodification are leading to the 
erosion of social accountability and equity in South African society; first, the growth and 
development (the re-birth) of private security, second, the pre-existence and phenomenal 
growth of illegal auspices of governance and third, the rise of community governance 
institutions.  While these three developments overlap to some extent, it is useful to keep 
them separate, even if just on a practical level.       
 
We live in a world where many of the biggest economies are corporate entities.
214
  As a 
result of this the ‘public good’ in all walks of life has taken a back seat to ‘private goods’, 
‘common goods’ and ‘club goods’.
215
  The fragmented nature of policing, and the 
proliferation of private auspices of policing, means that traditional democratic models 
and modes of achieving police accountability only take into account about half of the 
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  These mechanisms of accountability, however, become more stretched 
in transitional states because of the legacies and weak infrastructure left behind by 
oppressive regimes.  The relatively ungovernable nature of many auspices of security 
provision has scary implications for democracy and equity in these and other settings.   
 
At present there seems to be a danger that we may end up with the worst of all 
possible worlds: increasingly large and centralized police services with ever- 
growing powers, alongside the anarchic emergence of unregulated self-help and 




In South Africa, the (already lacking) mechanisms of accountability struggle to regulate 
the public police (at any practical level, even though theoretically the public police are 
accountable
218
) which means that they are a far cry from being able to regulate the 
multitude of (private and community) auspices of security governance.  Debates relating 
to the control and regulation of the public police were raging after the fall of the apartheid 
regime.  There was a general belief that South African policing should mimic Western 
patterns of policing.
219
  The liberal-democratic form of policing to be followed by South 
Africa forwarded a two-fold approach – first, that policing should be constrained by the 
‘rule of law’ (legal accountability) and, second, that the goals and strategies of policing 
should have the support of the people as a whole (social accountability).
220
  Now, 
however, South Africa has to contend with being a regulatory state;
221
 one responsible for 
the regulation of a variety of institutional governance actors.  The wholly lacking 
regulatory infrastructure to achieve this is just one of its many problems in this regard.  
The large variety of non-state governance actors active in South Africa is another, and 
the growth of exclusionary communities (such as gated communities or Business 
Improvement Districts) is yet another. 
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South Africa faces the re-birth of private security auspices of governance.  These thinly 
accountable policing actors far outweigh the public police (SAPS) in numbers and the 
industry has been growing at an alarming rate
222
 making them even more pervasive as 
security providers and more attractive to consumers in the market for protection.  The 
private security industry has been rapidly growing in South Africa since the late 1970s 
and boomed in the 1980s.
223
  This rapid growth has its roots entrenched in apartheid and 
can be attributed to two things; first, the withdrawal of the South African Police (SAP) 
from its normal duties in the late 1970s to a focus on political control and, second, the 
passing of the National Key Points Act in 1980
224
 which granted powers of arrest and 
search and seizure to those security personnel guarding strategic sites defined by the 
Act.
225
  The Act stipulated that the proprietors of these strategic sites (of which 413 were 
‘Key Points’ and 800 were ‘semi-Key Points’
226
) were responsible for their protection.  
The South African Defence Force (SADF) was responsible for many of these sites and 
influenced the private security firms guarding them to take on a more para-military guise 
in line with SADF standards.
227
  This created a market for private security firms in South 
Africa; as Berg notes: 
 
The State, by requiring that Key Point proprietors provide security, inadvertently 
created a market for security since the private security companies began to view 




It has been estimated that the private security industry now outnumbers the SAPS by four 
to one in terms of personnel
229
 and, being much more competitive in terms of market 
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forces; private security companies tend to be more consumer-orientated and better 
equipped to deal with crime than the SAPS.
230
  It is clear that the rapid growth of the 
private security industry and its current state has made it, I contend, the primary provider 
of security while the South African state has to settle for the role of regulator.
231
  Baker 
has also noticed this trend: 
  
Non-state policing in its various forms is becoming institutionalized in substantial 
sectors of society as the normal channel of criminal justice.  This is particularly 
true in two contexts: first, where the SAPS stand back, either to allow natural 
justice to take its course, as they did in the murder of a gangland leader in the 
Cape Flats, or in their failure to successfully prosecute criminals, as in the case of 
the security guard and ex-policeman who shot dead forty-one alleged burglars 




The drive by big business and well-off individuals to make use of private security 
services in South Africa has meant that social accountability of primary governance 
actors has taken a back seat to contractual accountability of these actors.  It is a truism 
that private auspices of governance (like the ones seen to be proliferating South African 
society) answer only to those who opt to use their services.  Therefore, those who opt out, 
either by choice or not, of security markets in South Africa are immediately 
disadvantaged because the actors who operate within and through security markets are 
not publicly accountable to them even though their crime prevention techniques may well 
affect the general public.  Shearing and Wood alert us to the fact that the pursuit of 
common goods (instead of public goods) may be detrimental to the achievement of public 
goods.
233
  An example of this in South Africa are the City Improvement District (CID) 
initiatives run in, for instance, Johannesburg, Cape Town and other cities which were 
implemented to ensure economic growth and a security in certain business districts and 
                                                                                                                                                 
229
 Schonteich M Unshackling the Crime Fighters – Increasing Private Sector Involvement in the South 




 Tshehla B ‘Barricaded in the Suburbs: Private Security via Road Closures’ (2003) 6 SA Crime Quarterly 
17-20.  
232
 Baker (note 4) at 48 [my emphasis]. 
233
 Shearing & Wood (note 94) at 209. 
 60 
which employ private security firms in conjunction with the SAPS.
234
    The down side to 
these initiatives is encapsulated in the following statement by:   
 
We can see that, if partly valid, the argument of the “lack of capacity” of the State 
to manage and regulate security on its territories, and the implied necessity of 
setting up partnerships with more capacitated or complementary stakeholders 
such as the communities and the private sector, can also be used for political 
purposes. In particular it has been instrumentalized to allow the municipalities to 
lead growth strategies (business-friendly and creating safety conditions in the 
zones of economic opportunity, even at the price of social segregation, fiscal 




Another point to note is the fact that the private security market in South Africa is 
probably much more attractive to those who can afford it than the public police for 
reasons of choice and contractual obligations and, perhaps most importantly, because of 
the lack of trust in the SAPS.  The latter is hardly surprising seeing as the public police 
often display autocratic characteristics which are akin to those attributed to the SAP 
under apartheid.  Many obvious displays of the use of excessive force by the police and 
their abuse of police powers have been recorded since 1994.  Between the years 1997 and 
2004 a number of deaths as a result of police action were recorded by the Independent 
Complaints Directorate (ICD) (over 4500, over a third of which were caused while the 
victims were in police custody).
236
  One particular example of police brutality comes to 
mind here.  In November 2000, a number of ‘suspected illegal immigrants’ were attacked 
by police dogs after the dogs had been set on them by the North East Rand Dog unit in a 
“sadistic training exercise.”
237
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These types of outbursts by the SAPS would act to reinforce distrust in the public police 
in South Africa and made it evermore difficult to achieve accountability seeing as many 
began outsourcing their security needs to private police.  Loader talks about the public 
police in Britain being identified within the minds of citizens as the primary source of 
governance, security and protection from crime; as being the “symbols of law, order and 
nation.”
238
  As far as South Africa is concerned, there can be nothing further from the 
mind of the average citizen whether wealthy or impoverished.  The abuses committed by 
the SAP under apartheid will not soon be forgotten and the zero-tolerance approach taken 
by the SAPS will strengthen these memories.  This has made it almost impossible for the 
SAPS to establish any kind of legitimacy with the South African people.  This acts to 
further reinforce the role of private security firms as primary governance actors.  
 
It has been argued that non-state auspices of governance are accountable to faculties 
beyond the nation-state such as commercial laws and, going further, the criminal law.
239
  
But, in South Africa, the board that is supposed to regulates the private security industry, 
Security Industry Regulatory Authority (SIRA) (which is regulated by the Private 
Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001), for example, is either lacking in sufficient 
infrastructure to enforce its regulations or has been corrupted at the highest level; as 
Baker points out: 
 
At a more mundane level, it is disturbing that the [private security] industry is so 
weakly supervised.  The regulatory authority when it was known as the Security 
Officers Interim Board, revoked the accreditation of thirty training institutions 
and a handful of registered firms, but contraventions of the code of conduct by 
registered firms is widespread and the SAPS has done little to tackle the large 
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Stenning has been at the forefront of the private police accountability literature and notes 
several ways by which private police can be held accountable.  These include state 
regulation (state regulatory boards et cetera), industry self-regulation (internal regulatory 
boards et cetera), criminal liability (regulatory legislation), civil liability (regulatory 
legislation), labour/employment law (labour legislation), contractual liability (contract 
legislation) and accountability through the market (fiscal accountability).
241
  These forms 
of accountability are legitimate but difficult to achieve in a transitional state (due to 
institutional deficits, see example of SIRA above) or do not lead to social accountability 
of private auspices of governance (for example, contractual liability and accountability 
through the market only accrue accountability to those willing to enter the security 
market or enter a contractual agreement [which usually entails some sort of financial 
output]).  The proliferation of private police and their rise as primary governance actors, 
then, has eroded social accountability over policing in South Africa to a great degree.  
South Africa’s regulatory mechanisms (such as SIRA and the Private Security Industry 
Regulation Act) are not capable of providing public (and legal) accountability with 
respect to these firms and the contractual and financial obligations they uphold are 
limited to only a select few.   
 
South Africa is a state built on an oppressive past; a past partly responsible for the 
multitude of governance actors now operating in the country.  Many of these auspices of 
governance operate below the state and beyond the law and are a cause for concern when 
it comes to social accountability.  One category of these illegal auspices is what Johnston 
calls autonomous citizen responses;
242
 groups of people that act independently of the state 
and are often prepared to break the law to achieve their goals.  They are more regularly 
called vigilantes.  Daniel Nina states the following: 
 
Vigilantism will adopt either a crime or a social order approach.  In either case, it 
is linked directly to the use of physical force and intimidation at levels not 
normally used by the state.  In the denial of the state as the guarantor of the social 
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order, vigilantism will invoke an ‘imagined order’ that either existed in the past 
(in its decadent mode), or never existed but is desired (in its idealised 
mode)…Vigilantism appropriates state functions in a way that creates a parallel 




This appropriation of state functions fits neatly into the model developed in chapter two 
whereby nodes assimilate the functions and characteristics of other nodes so as to achieve 
their governance goals more effectively.  In South Africa, these types of nodal 
arrangements are common.  Vigilante groups also have their roots in apartheid and were 
often formed in the townships and had political agendas.  Perhaps the largest vigilante 
group in the country is ‘Mapogo a mathamaga’
244
 which was formed in 1996 and 
operates in Gauteng and the Northern Province.
245
  The formation and use of these groups 
also stems from the perceived inability of the SAPS to perform their duties efficiently.  
According to Baker: 
 
The crime control element [of vigilante groups in South Africa] is fuelled by 
frustration with respect to the SAPS’s inability, through lack of resources and 





A second category of governance actors operating beyond the law is, of course, criminal 
gangs.  Gangs have become a big problem in South Africa (specifically in the Western 
Cape) and date back to the early twentieth century.  They operate much like business 
organizations
247
 and govern security in their areas much like vigilantes, albeit for private 
ends. 
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[G]angs have a central, and even unavoidable, role to play in both peace-keeping 
and peace-making on the Cape Flats.  It is easy to exclude these social actors on 




So, we are left with these illegal and unregulated auspices of governance, borne from a 
specific set of circumstances unique to transitional states or, indeed, unique to South 
Africa.  Any attempts at achieving accountability of these auspices would probably be in 
vain.  They are concerned not with the public good but with private goods and common 
goods which makes them difficult to regulate in terms of anything but the criminal law 
which, to this date, has been ineffective.  Prior to the ANC administration in the Western 
Cape, anti-gang strategies were highly criticised for being unstrategic and ineffective
249
 
and even the more recent anti-gang legislation is a far cry from being able to hold gangs 
and gang members criminally accountable and liable.
250
  In fact, the SAPS have a long 
record of looking the other way or even assisting criminal gangs in their pursuits.  One 
example of this is the police’s provision of arms to the Khumalo gang in Kwa-Zulu Natal 
in the early 1990s.   
  
Along with their ties to the IFP, the Khumalo gang had extensive police 
connections. The Murder and Robbery Squad in Benoni reportedly attended 
barbecues at different houses owned by gang members and supplied the names 
and car registration numbers of people they wanted killed to the Archbishop 
whose men would then carry out the murders. In return the police provided the 
gang with weapons and protected them from prosecution and their ANC enemies. 
Khumalo admitted before the TRC that he had round the clock protection from 
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It is a truism that these auspices of governance are self-interested and privately motivated 
‘businesses’ and have influence over and are influenced by (perhaps more legitimate) 
nodes.  They operate like the community governance institutions spoken about in chapter 
two; with the distinguishing factor of their criminality being the only difference.  Their 
conceptions of a common good would be the pursuit of justice (which is warped in the 
case of vigilante groups) or the pursuit of some sort of material wealth (as is the case with 
criminal gangs).  One could go as far as to say that the latter of these two groups promote 
narrow private interests
252
 and are accountable only to themselves.  Allow me to theorise, 
if you will, that these (illegitimate) nodes assimilate and are assimilated by more 
legitimate nodes (such as community institutions).  This would effectively allow the 
pervasion of criminal intent into these legitimate nodes which would act to further harm 
the public good.   
 
Moreover, the growing number of these institutions in areas of South Africa where the 
public police are perceived to be ineffective (or are truly ineffective) means that the 
communities in which they operate are either forced to accept their governance or accept 
their governance willingly.
253
  This leads to a growing number of areas in South Africa in 
which the more publicly accountable SAPS are less inclined to police (because, among 
other thing, the gang members greatly outnumber police personnel in these areas
254
) 
meaning the greater erosion of social accountability which cannot be achieved with these 
illegitimate auspices of governance.  This all reminds us of Marenins
255
 depiction of the 




State policing…is implicated in the protection of ‘specific order’ – the 
preservation of the present pattern of domination within the polity and the defence 
of the interests of those whom that pattern favours; while also being implicated in 
the protection of ‘general order’ – the preservation of basic standards of public 
tranquility in which all social groups have a stake.  State policing, therefore, is 
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simultaneously both partial and universal, interested and disinterested, divisive 
and inclusive – and the intersection of reason and violence at its heart both 
conditions and is recursively conditioned by the terms of the accommodation 




This leads us nicely into a discussion of legitimate community governance institutions 
(chapter two).  These, too, have been on the rise in South Africa and have come in 
various forms from Business Improvement Districts
258
 to gated communities.  The latter 
of these forms have probably been the most prominent in the country since state 
democratization as the state has been unable to provide adequate security for a select few. 
Landman and Schönteich put it like this: 
  
One of the consequences of the state’s inability to protect the life and property of 
all its citizens—especially in developing countries—is the formation of private 
alternatives to crime prevention and control. Gated communities, or enclosed 




One consequence of these community institutions is their exclusionary capacity and their 
ability to enforce ‘club goods’.
260
  Another is, more obviously, their lack of social 
accountability.  This new type of segregation has meant that these communities and 
institutions are able to impose their whims on their surrounds without being held publicly 
accountable for this, even if their whims are detrimental to society at large.  Also, seeing 
as the public police do not normally bother with such communities because these 
communities are usually protected by private security firms, they become even more 
unregulated in terms of the public good.  Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) are a 
good example of how these institutions are contrary to social accountability, at least on a 
theoretical level.   
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The BID initiatives in Cape Town and Johannesburg are making certain areas ‘sites of 
unaccountable power’.
261
  It has already been established in chapter two that some 
corporations have become ‘strong actors’
262
 in governance because of their 
overwhelming ability to both row and steer governance functions (they have, in effect, 
become ‘private governments’.
263
  BIDs create ‘new’ spaces;
264
 they transform public 
spaces into quasi-public spaces and often employ private security firms to enforce their 
notions of what is in their best interest (more likely than not, this interest involves 
economic growth).  Their accountability and obligations usually lie in contract law and 
the contracts they sign with the various businesses in their area of operation.
265
  One 
would think that this would at least provide legal accountability and guarantee that the 
public good is maintained, however, their contractual agreements usually do not bind 
them to ensuring that their activities are kept socially responsible and even though some 
institutions may contribute to the public good none are held accountable for not doing 
so.
266
     
 
The erosion of social accountability in South Africa inevitably relates to issues of equity 
in a free society.  The ‘re-feudalization’ of security governance
267
 raises complex public 
interest and (possibly) constitutional issues.  Every South African has a specific set of 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), one of which is 
equity.  The wealth disparity in the country is well known but is being deepened and 
widened due to the fragmentation and commodification of security governance and the 
erosion of social accountability of non-state governance auspices.  It has been noted that 
this growing wealth disparity is associated with the governance disparity between rich 
and poor. 
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While it is difficult to obtain systematic data to support this claim, the evidence 
suggests that the growing ‘wealth’ disparity between the rich and the poor is 
associated with a growing ‘governance’ disparity.  One feature of this disparity is 
the relative inability of those without purchasing power to participate in these new 
forms of political power.  This is very obvious in the security sector, where those 
with purchasing power are able to extend and strengthen their ‘security quilt’ by 
engaging, directing, and tailoring service delivery.  In addition, many state 
policing services now provide services on a user-friendly basis over and above 
their general services, wealthier persons and corporate entities can purchase these 




This is reminiscent of the governance deficits spoken about earlier.  What is disturbing is 
the fact that it is those who are already disadvantaged (economically, politically and 
socially) who bear the brunt of theses new developments in policing and those who are 
already advantaged benefit from them.
269
  Citizens have become self-calculating, risk-
monitoring consumers of the new security technology
270
 and it is only the rich who can 
claim to consume.  The fact that many governance institutions proliferating South Africa 
are much more concerned with achieving private, common or club goods (including the 
public police) and that many have economic interests (such as private security firms)
271
 is 
certainly cause for concern.  What is much more concerning, however, is the fact that 
some non-state actors of governance are actually creating an underclass of citizens in 
South Africa
272
 which can be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to exacerbate inequality.  
This is particularly striking when one looks at the number of gated communities in the 
country; communities most concerned with keeping ‘undesirables’ out.  
 
Some interesting theories have been forwarded by various authors on these gated 
communities.  One, in particular, stands out in my mind.  Richard Ballard proposes that 
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gated communities in South Africa are the result of white South Africans wrestling with 
the contradiction between the identities to which they aspire – those of the ‘European’, 
‘civilised’ and ‘modern’ – and those identities more closely associated with the region in 
which they settled – ‘uncivilised’, ‘backward’ and ‘third world’.  In order to create 
environments in which the identities to which they aspire could flourish, systems of 
segregation were developed – gated communities.
273
  This fits nicely with my belief that 
we are, in South Africa, facing a new form of separateness similar to that form which was 
the basis of apartheid but with one important difference.  Instead of this form of 
separateness being based on race, it is based on class which, for reasons I cannot 
understand, is more acceptable in today’s society.  Perhaps this acceptance is due to the 
fact that it is a more indirect form of separateness, that is, instead of being actively 
enforced by the state it is passively supported through the state’s lack of concern in 
regulating exclusionary structures like gated communities or Business Improvement 
Districts (although efforts have been made in Johannesburg to regulate gated 
communities).  These structures act to close off public space (as discussed above) and 
extenuate inequalities because 
  
...instead of being concerned about individual civil rights or human rights, private 
security of the “new” public space is more concerned about how to create 
conditions which can assist in promoting the logic of capital accumulation and the 




The nature of our exclusive society
275
 is such that we segregate the criminal ‘Other’ 
without knowing who they are and this, basically, boils down to unequal treatment. 
Community Policing initiatives in South Africa and in Africa generally have been guilty 
of this kind of discrimination.  Ruteere and Pommerolle’s work deals with community 
policing initiatives in Kenya and discuss the implications of these initiatives for Kenyan 
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   They note that wholesale exclusions take place in the communities in which 
these initiatives are being run with preferential access given to the economic and political 
elite.
277
  Similarly, in Uganda community policing was seen by the police as a means to 
instruct local communities and, as a result, these communities were not consulted with in 
regards to crime prevention.
278
  Closer to home, Bayley has noted a few things that are 
particularly relevant when it comes to community policing and equality in South 
Africa.
279
  He argues that community policing and private security both aim to respond to 
their clients with “prevention, mobilization, and the provision of substantive benefits.”
280
  
Community policing may act to reinforce market dualisms in a particular setting by 
providing the rich (who have private security guards) with a “preventative, penetrating, 
consensual model”
281
 while the poor are left with a “reactive, restrictive, procedural due-
process one.”
282
  Loader also recognizes the effect of commodification on existing 
boundaries (of rich and poor): 
 
Consumption choices ‘express and generate culture’…mark and maintain social 
relationships create patterns of identification and discrimination.  Consumer 
goods and services are, in short, ‘social markers’, such that: ‘in being offered, 




In South Africa the over-reliance on non-state policing acts to greatly undermine the 
legitimacy of the SAPS.
284
  However, the absence of visible SAPS patrols in rural areas 
has added to this over-reliance and the erosion of their legitimacy.  Pelser et al. 
interviewed 756 rural people across the country in 1998.
285
  Of those interviewed, 7% 
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said that their communities made its own arrangements for protection, 80% said they 
thought this was effective, 35% believed that the SAPS could control crime in their area 
while the majority thought that it was doing a poor job; most rural respondents had 
limited access to the SAPS.
286
  As a final thought, it is quite worrying to note that lack of 
faith in the SAPS and reliance on non-state auspices of security governance could cause 
the SAPS to pull out of disadvantaged communities in large part, or completely, 
believing that the communities could ‘take care of themselves’.  This might have the 
effect of causing disadvantaged people to necessarily enter the security market and 
exacerbate inequalities further.       





Concluding Remarks: Towards a Normative Framework of Security 
Governance in South Africa 
 
The government I have the honour to lead and I dare say 
the masses who elected us to serve in this role, are 
inspired by the single vision of creating a people-centred 
society. 
 
Accordingly, the purpose that will drive this government 
shall be the expansion of the frontiers of human 
fulfilment, the continuous extension of the frontiers of… 
freedom. 
 
The acid test of the legitimacy of the programmes we 
elaborate, the government institutions we create, the 
legislation we adopt must be whether they serve these 
objectives. 
 
Our single most important challenge is therefore to help 
establish a social order in which the freedom of the 
individual will truly mean the freedom of the individual. 
 
We must construct that people-centred society of freedom 
in such a manner that it guarantees the political and the 
human rights of all our citizens (Mandela, 1994). 
 
The last half of the twentieth century has been characterised by the fragmentation and 
commodification of policing.  This phenomenon has effectively ‘hollowed out the 
state’
287
 in most cases and has exacerbated inequalities and posed a number of challenges 
to social accountability of those who police.  The activity of policing has been removed 
from the exclusive realm of the state and governance actors and auspices have begun to 
flood security markets all around the world.  In transitional states (that is, states in the 
transition from autocratic rule to democratic rule) the issues of fragmentation and 
commodification become ever more acute and in need of attention.  The transitional 
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dynamics of these states (such as weak institutional arrangements and citizen skepticism 
in the state) makes them more susceptible to the effects of the ‘new’ policing.   
 
The implications of commodification and fragmentation are far-reaching for both 
transitional and other states.  Two primary implications immediately come to mind.  In 
the first instance the phenomenon has caused the proliferation of policing actors and 
auspices that operate above and beyond government (such as Europol, Interpol et cetera).  
Debates as to the power of these institutions are of growing importance.
288
  These 
governance auspices can act to perpetuate xenophobia and ‘othering’ discourses.
289
  
Second, the rapid growth and global proliferation of security markets means that access 
to policing and basic security, which were once fundamental human rights, have now 
become privilege; accessible only to those who are willing to opt into the security market 
and have the material wealth to do so.  This has meant the erosion of basic human rights, 
accountability and equity in many instances. 
 
Towards a Normative Framework of Security Governance 
in South Africa  
 
The situation as far as social accountability and equity in South Africa is concerned is 
dire.  If changes at a very real level are not made soon South African policing may not be 
able to cope with the existing governance deficits and may perpetuate or worsen 
inequality in the country.  I propose that the following normative framework for 
governance in South Africa is essential for making sure this does not happen.  In 
developing a normative framework as to how the various governance nodes can and 
should operate, relate to each other and work to lessen inequality and achieve social 
accountability we should look to the hybrid model of nodal governance outlined in 
chapter two as it is useful for working within in terms of governance deficits, specifically 
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in the South African context.  I take as my starting point Jones and Newburn’s 




Allow me to argue that this connection cannot take place unless social accountability of 
all governance actors in South Africa (and other transitional states) is achieved.  
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to achieve this on any real practical level any time soon.  
It would require a huge overhaul of criminal justice institutions and legislation in South 
Africa.  I do, however, believe that it would be useful to discuss this on a theoretical level 
without rehashing in any great detail the need for institutional reform (which is 
something everyone knows is needed).  Suffice to say that governance and regulatory 
institutions in South Africa (such as SIRA) need to function at a much higher level.   
 
It is imperative that social accountability is no longer seen as ‘accountability of the South 
African government’ but as accountability within the new regulatory state framework.
291
  
The sovereignty and economic power of the state is now but a mere memory; some of the 
most powerful economies in the world are corporations
292
 and therefore it has become 
redundant to conceive of the accountability of the state as being all-important.  The state 
is but one node which governs and, possibly, is governed by other nodes.  This is 
evidenced in the assimilatory capacity of nodes as South Africa, as with many other 
states, has succumbed to the call of managerialism, promotionalism and consumerism.   
 
I am a very firm believer in what Loader has termed governance from below.
293
  I also 
believe the key to success in achieving social accountability and, therefore, stopping the 
tide of inequality lies in the role of the public police becoming a more active one.  With 
these beliefs in mind I can note that individuals and auspices in South Africa need to stop 
looking at those nodes operating above and beyond government for security and realize 
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that their own protection lies in their local capacities and resources.  This will ensure that 
deficits of community self-direction, and other deficits, are minimized.
294
  This will at 
least give local communities some control over their governance choices and some 
influence over the goods they receive.  Gated communities are one example of how this is 
already taking place in South Africa.  Nodal (institutional) arrangements have to be set up 
so that disadvantaged communities have these types of capacities, although, one big 
logistical problem with this is that of budgets.
295
 
   
Further, the public police need to rise to their role as a regulatory node of the various 
governance actors in South Africa; that is, they need to be “responsive to non-legal 
normative orderings.”
296
  Here I share the sentiments of Loader and Walker when they 
note the following: 
  
In the  face of a proliferation of plural, fragmented policing bodies, the state 
(alone) possesses the knowledge, and experience required both to ‘steer’ the 
delivery of services among diverse policing forms, to coordinate the relationship 
of policing agencies to other governmental authorities, and to ensure that the 
increasingly complex institutional pattern of policing does not present a closed 
and self-corroborating bureaucratic system, opaque and unresponsive to its wider 
public environment.
297
   
 
On the other side of the coin it is ultimately the public police who must be responsible for 
providing security for disadvantaged communities in South Africa (over and above those 
local community initiatives which can only provide a limited amount of protection); those 
communities that cannot opt into the security market and partake of its fruits.  In other 
words, the SAPS need to be concerned with covering the governance deficits, or ‘picking 
up the slack’, in these communities.  A sense of social responsibility needs to be injected 
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into the network of security providers, both state and non-state, in South Africa.  It is a 
truism that governance nodes respond to incentives.  In an OGS, these incentives can be 
seen as ‘goods’ that governing nodes want to achieve.  I propose that more incentive is 
provided for being socially responsible as a node of governance.  This will ensure that the 
‘public good’ is, at least in part, achieved where it had previously taken a back seat to 
private or common goods (such as in the case of community governance institutions).  It 
is the job of the state (the regulators) to provide such incentives.  But the regulators must 
have a sense of social responsibility themselves so that they “[do not]…simply impose 
control, but…activate and draw upon the conscience and the talents of those they seek to 
regulate.”
298
  In other words, accountability mechanisms that cause regulated actors to 
work defensively to avoid blame should be circumvented; instead accountability 
mechanisms that cause regulate actors to act creatively and take responsibility for 




In addition to the state as a regulatory institution, non-state regulatory institutions should 
be encouraged in South Africa.  This would ensure civilian oversight of policing in the 
country and would provide a backup if the state institutions falter on their obligation to 
make sure that public goods are achieved.  These non-state institutions could take the 
form of police commissions.  Here, I stand with Loader (2000: 338-9): 
 
…policing commissions clearly need to be given a statutory responsibility to take 
account of potential inequalities in the distribution of policing resources, and to 
seek where necessary to rectify them when making policy/network coordinating 
decisions…In respect of its functions, policing commissions would – at national, 
regional and local levels – be constituted with both a general obligation to 
coordinate and integrate policing and security services across their geographical 
area of responsibility, and the specific task of rendering accountable the discrete 
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public, municipal, commercial and voluntary bodies who might provide – or want 




Policing commissions in South Africa would function much like state institutions; 
inviting tenders from public, municipal, commercial or voluntary agencies who may offer 
their services or buying power to ensure equity is achieved.  Policing commissions, 
however, may put added pressure on, and may mean added responsibility for, the already 
over-stretched public police in South Africa and other African countries.   
 
I also believe that the ethos of restorative justice could also be useful when 
conceptualized within the hybrid nodal governance framework in South Africa.  This has 
already become the norm with such initiatives as the Community Peace Project.
301
  Baker 
refers to these as ‘dispute resolution forums’.
302
   Restorative justice initiatives should 
function as community (or grassroots level) nodes to ensure bottom-up governance, 
which would ensure bottom-up accountability as citizens would not have to subscribe to 
traditional top-down mechanisms of accountability.  Although top-down approaches 
cannot be discounted they do involve, as we have already discovered, entail lengthy and 
often fruitless procedures and institutional reform the likes of which South Africa cannot 
manage in a short space of time.  Restorative justice would be particularly useful for 
South Africa because it would act to minimize the exclusionary potentials of community 
governance institutions. 
 
Restorative justice appeals because it offers the possibility of taking crime 
seriously without ever-increasing repression and exclusion.  Above all, it appeals 
because it offers the prospect of escaping the ‘zero-sum’, whereby what benefits 
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This escape from ‘zero-sum’ would, in my opinion, reduce levels of crime in 
disadvantaged areas (where restorative justice is most useful) by effectively dealing with 
petty offenders without penal sanction and, therefore, leading to a reduction in the 
numbers of ‘hardened criminals’ coming out of the penal system.  A short example of this 
might make my point clearer.  In the case of petty theft, the (petty) offender who is sent 
to prison would exit the penal system with more resentment for the state and better 
equipped to commit more serious offences (such as rape and murder) whereas the (petty) 
offender who, after going through the restorative justice process, is genuinely rueful for 
his offence would be much easier to reintegrate into society as a productive rather than a 
destructive citizen.  I therefore propose that a framework with the following 
characteristics would be useful in achieving social accountability and, therefore, 
alleviating inequalities of governance: 
 
• The general acceptance that the sovereignty of the state, if not dead, is extremely 
weak and the acceptance of the fragmented nature of security governance; 
• Following this, the conception (or acceptance) of the state as but one node in a 
network of security and the acceptance that social accountability of the state alone 
(as opposed to other non-state nodes) is not useful; 
• The pursuance of governance from below and the empowerment of disadvantaged 
communities as far as self-governance is concerned; 
• The acceptance that the public police are no longer governance actors in many 
instances but are ‘regulators’ of security networks and their increased  ability to 
deal with governance deficits and ‘pick up the slack’; 
• The acceptance that incentives to increase social responsibility of non-state 
governing nodes (especially corporations) need to be implemented to ensure 
increased equity; 
• The pursuance of non-state regulatory institutions (such as policing 
commissions); 
• The pursuance of a restorative justice ethos which will ensure bottom-up 
accountability and lower crime rates in disadvantaged areas.  
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This framework, in conjunction with wider social and institutional transformations, 
should ensure that social accountability and equity are achieved to at least some extent in 
South Africa.    
 
Light at the End of the Tunnel 
 
Although the fragmentation and commodification pose a number of challenges to 
democratic, equitable and accountable rule, it is here to stay.  The sooner we embrace 
pluralisation, the sooner we can begin to use it to achieve all the aspects of social life it 
has challenged.  I believe that there is a bright light at the end of the tunnel for security 
governance both in South Africa and elsewhere.  The pluralisation of policing has not 
brought with it only dire implications and mechanisms, it as also brought good.  It has 
given citizens the ability to choose their security providers.  This is particularly useful in 
states where the public police are inefficient in crime control.  It has brought with it 
community mechanisms such as restorative justice and allowed, to some extent, bottom-
up governance to take place.  It has also stimulated economic growth and made 
traditional policing mechanisms aware of their service provision, or lack thereof.  It is 
just my sincere hope that, in the near future, social accountability is achieved and 
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The research process is fraught with difficulties. The first inklings of a paper of this 
nature were deeply rooted in Zimbabwe in June 2006, and in Mike Brogden’s (2004) 
work Commentary: Community Policing: A Panacea from the West?  I remember waiting 
in a queue outside a petrol station (which are a common occurrence in Zimbabwe) and 
reading this enthralling essay about the pains of community policing in Africa.  The 
development of this particular paper went through a number of staged and, sometimes 
without me knowing, a number of titles – ‘Pluralisation, Commodification and Politics: 
An Exploration into the Political and Economic Dimensions of Community Policing’, 
‘Fragmentation, Commodification and Politics: An Exploration into the Political and 
Economic Dimensions of Community Policing in South Africa’, ‘Fragmentation and 
Commodification: Exploring the Political and Economic Dimensions of Cape Town’s 
Central City Improvement District (CCID)’, ‘Fragmentation, Commodification and 
Politics: Exploring the Political and Economic Dimensions of the ‘New’ Policing’.  These 
were just a few of the many titles considered for this essay.  At the end of October 2006, 
the completion of this project seemed a distant memory and panic began to set in.  I 
would spend my days playing Microsoft Flight Simulator and reading large volumes of 
policing texts while the aeroplane flew itself on auto-pilot.  In fact, it felt almost as if I 
was on auto-pilot myself; with one purpose – to soak in as much of the policing literature 
as I could.  Throughout this time, my girlfriend and close friends were a collective tower 
of strength for me – putting up with my (sometimes violent) outbursts and considerably 
shorter temper.  By the end of November I had read over thirty different articles (which 
was not really that many) and had decided that it was wholly impractical to go into the 
field and conduct research – I had decided on a theoretical approach to this project and 
was much happier for it.  Still, however, time was against me and throughout December 
(even on Christmas day) I worked to complete this project.  My work ethic was at a level 
it had never been before and, by the beginning of January and without consultation with 
my supervisors, I began to write the introductory chapters of this paper.  The rest, as they 
sometimes say, is history.  It was certainly an enjoyable, if extremely stressful, experience 
(especially seeing as Microsoft Flight Simulator had not failed me).  People often say 
that if you really love doing something you would inevitably enjoy doing it, no matter 
how tedious.  I think I have proved those people right here.      
